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BOSTON UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL

Thesis

SHIPPING IN MASSACHUSETTS. 1803-1820.

~~(A Study of the Conditions and Laws Affecting It.)~~

by

William Henry Downey, Jr.
(A.B., Dartmouth College, 1931)

Submitted in partial fulfilment of the
requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts

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The government of the United States began an attempt to stimulate the Atlantic trade by passing the first law on the subject of shipping. Fishing is not to be classified with shipping and yet both are in a slight manner correlated and the attempt to aid fishing also aided shipping as we notice when reading the provisions of the law. The Act of July 4th stimulated shipping by allowing a reduction of one tenth of the Custom duties on goods imported in vessels built and owned by American citizens.¹ On July 30 another statute was passed providing that importations of tea in vessels similarly owned should pay 50 to 60 per cent less than importations in foreign bottoms.² Thus, a Salem vessel with a cargo of 100,000 pounds of tea would pay \$10,000 while a British ship with the same cargo would pay \$27,000 in duties. The East India trade was fostered because tea in an American vessel, according to Paine, was taxed twelve cents a pound, while tea in foreign vessels was taxed twenty-seven cents a pound.³ Another provision of the above act further provided a scale of increased duties on tea importations in American vessels entering from countries other than those in which the cargo originated, thus making it cheaper to import tea in

1. Paine, Ralph C. The Old Merchant Marine. Chronicle of American Seafaring. Allan Johnson, Editor. New Haven 1921.

2. Seafaring, Vol. 3. The Heritage of Tyne. New York 1918. Appendix p. 23

3. Paine Old Merchant Marine, p. 36-37

1. Uses steam to go to Liverpool &c.
2. The Great East of the Savannah &c.
3. Description of them &c.
4. Origin of Pokoke &c.

CHAPTER I

DEVELOPMENTS IN SHIPPING AND LAWS PERTAINING TO IT FROM 1789-1812

In 1789--July 4th to be exact--the government of the United States began an attempt to stimulate the Atlantic trade by passing the first law on the subject of fishing. Fishing is not to be classified with shipping and yet both are in a slight manner correlated and the attempt to aid fishing also aided shipping as we notice when reading the provisions of the law. The Act of July 4th stimulated shipping by allowing a reduction of one tenth of the Custom duties on goods imported in vessels built and owned by American citizens.¹ On July 20 another statute was passed providing that importations of tea in vessels similarly owned should pay 50 to 60 per cent less than importations in foreign bottoms.² Thus, a Salem vessel with a cargo of 100,000 pounds of tea would pay \$10,980 while a British ship with the same cargo would pay \$27,800 in duties. The East India trade was fostered because tea in an American vessel, according to Paine, was taxed twelve cents a pound, while tea in foreign vessels was taxed twenty-seven cents a pound.³ Another provision of the above Act further provided a scale of increased duties on tea importations in American vessels entering from countries other than those in which the cargo originated, thus making it cheaper to import teas in

1. Paine, Ralph D. The Old Merchant Marine. Chronicles of America Series. Allan Johnson, Editor. New Haven 1921. Yale University Press. p. 96-97
2. Meloney, Wm. B. The Heritage of Tyre. New York 1916. Macmillan p. 22
3. Paine. Old Merchant Marine. p. 96-97

CHAPTER I DEVELOPMENTS IN SHIPPING AND LAWS PERTAINING TO IT FROM 1789-1812

In 1789--July 4th to be exact--the government of the United States began an attempt to stimulate the Atlantic trade by passing the first law on the subject of fishing. Fishing is not to be classified with shipping and yet both are in a slight manner correlated and the attempt to aid fishing also aided shipping as we notice when reading the provisions of the law. The Act of July 4th stimulated shipping by allowing a reduction of one tenth of the custom duties on goods imported in vessels built and owned by American citizens.¹ On July 20 another statute was passed providing that importations of tea in vessels similarly owned should pay 20 to 30 per cent less than importations in foreign bottoms.² Thus, a Salem vessel with a cargo of 100,000 pounds of tea would pay \$10,980 while a British ship with the same cargo would pay \$87,800 in duties. The East India trade was fostered because tea in an American vessel, according to Paine, was taxed twelve cents a pound, while tea in foreign vessels was taxed twenty-seven cents a pound.³ Another provision of the above Act further provided a scale of increased duties on tea importations in American vessels entering from countries other than those in which the cargo originated, thus making it cheaper to import tea in

1. Paine, Ralph D. The Old Merchant Marine. Chronicles of American Seafaring. Allan Johnson, Editor. New Haven 1921. Yale University Press. p. 28-29.
2. Meloney, Wm. B. The Heritage of Tyne. New York 1916. Macmillan p. 28.
3. Paine, Ralph D. The Old Merchant Marine. p. 28-29.

American ships directly from India and China on the other side of the world than from London just across the Atlantic.¹ To strengthen still more the above laws a third statute was passed providing (a) that American-built vessels owned by foreigners should pay 30 cents a ton; (b) that American vessels both built and owned abroad should pay 50 cents a ton; (c) that American-built vessels of American ownership should pay tonnage duties of 6 cents a ton; (d) that American vessels wholly engaged in the coastal trade should pay only a single entry a year and that an alien should pay the tax as many times as he entered the port.² Congress proceeded to do even more for it now granted a bounty of \$1.50 to all deep-sea fishermen over twenty tons. Likewise in 1792 the laws were amended to add a 10 per cent tax over and above the regular customs on all importations under foreign flags.³

The results of all these laws and statutes are shown by the following figures.⁴ On December 31, 1789 the United States had 123,893 tons of shipping in deep-water commerce which carried 17 per cent of the country's imports and 30 per cent of its exports. On December 31, 1794, this fleet had increased to 438,863 tons which carried 91 per cent of the imports and 86 per cent of the exports. On December 31, 1796, the tonnage had increased to 576,733 and American bottoms were transporting 94 per cent of the imports and 90 per cent of the exports. The war between England and France in 1793 was disastrous to American shipping, but Jay's treaty in 1794 opened the

1. Meloney. Heritage of Tyre. p. 22

2. Ibid. P. 23

3. Ibid. p. 24

4. Ibid. p. 24

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The results of all these laws and statutes are shown by the following figures.⁴ On December 31, 1789 the United States had 123,883 tons of shipping in deep-water commerce which carried 17 per cent of the country's imports and 30 per cent of its exports. On December 31, 1794, this fleet had increased to 438,883 tons which carried 91 per cent of the imports and 86 per cent of the exports. On December 31, 1798, the tonnage had increased to 578,783 and American bottoms were transporting 94 per cent of the imports and 80 per cent of the exports. The war between England and France in 1793 was disastrous to American shipping, but Jay's treaty in 1794 opened the

1. Maloney, *Heritage of Tyne*, p. 22.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 23.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 24.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 24.

East Indies trade, although it also resulted in the complete freedom of trade for British shipping in American ports and did nothing about the right of search and impressment.¹ The treaty of Amiens signed in 1802 caused the carrying trade to diminish for a time but soon with war renewed there came a resultant boom in American trade which resulted until the advent of the Orders in Council, Milan and Berlin decrees and the Embargo. Trade boomed because the United States was the only neutral country.

Trade with the West Indies alone increased from \$2,144,000 in 1792 to \$9,700,000 in 1801.² From 1796 through 1807 the value of domestic exports equalled \$464,319,377 while the value of foreign exports was \$476,273,051³ while the total value of imports equalled \$138,500,000 in 1807. The domestic exports and foreign exports in 1807 alone equalled \$108,343,150 in value according to Bishop in his History of Manufactures. The domestic exports equalled \$48,699,592 in value and the value of the foreign exports equalled \$59,643,558.

The position of neutrality was beneficial because all of the colonial possessions of France, Spain, England, and Holland were opened to a neutral flag and the products--sugar, spices, coffee, etc., found their way to Europe in American ships.⁴ In 1805 Great Britain resumed the Rule of 1756 which stated that neutrals in time of war could carry on no trade which they had not been accustomed to carry on in time of peace.⁵

1. Paine. Old Merchant Marine, p.101

2. Adams, James T., New England in the Republic, 1776-1850. Boston, 1926. Little, Brown Company. p.239.

3. Pitkin, Timothy. A Statistical View of the Commerce of the United States of America. New Haven, 1835 p.370

4. Ibid. 13 chps. 596 pages. p.370

5. Ibid. p.370

East India trade, although it also resulted in the complete freedom of trade for British shipping in American ports and did nothing about the right of search and apprehension.¹ The treaty of Amiens signed in 1802 caused the carrying trade to flourish for a time but soon with war renewed there came a resultant boom in American trade which resulted until the advent of the Orders in Council, Milan and Berlin decrees and the embargo. Trade boomed because the United States was the only neutral country.

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1. Paine, *Old Merchant Marine*, p. 101.
2. Adams, *Journal of the Republic*, 1798-1800.
3. Bishop, *Timothy*, A Statistical View of the Commerce of the United States of America, New Haven, 1835 p. 240.
4. *United States of America*, New Haven, 1835 p. 240.
5. *United States of America*, New Haven, 1835 p. 240.

The English Revival of the Rule of 1756 was due to the decision of Sir William Scott in the case of the American ship *Essex*, which he found guilty of shipping goods not legally paying duties--i.e., United States gave a drawback on bills of lading cost. As a consequence, the American ship-owners protested vigorously with the exception of the Massachusetts ship-owners. The attitude of the shipping interests in that state is well shown by the action of Boston. The town of Boston sent a memorial to Congress protesting but in a very moderate tone, saying that caution was necessary and the government should not protest too vigorously and only appoint a special mission to aid Monroe who already was in London.¹ As a result a treaty, negotiated by Wm. Pinckney and Monroe, in 1806 provided that during the war then in progress European products might be carried to the port of any colony, belonging to the enemy of Great Britain, provided that they had been entered and landed in the United States and paid the ordinary duties; and on re-exportation should, after the drawback, have been subject to a duty, equivalent to not less than one per-cent ad valorem and were bona-fide the property of American citizens. It was also provided that the produce of the colonies of the enemies, might also be brought to the United States, there entered, landed, and having paid the duties might be re-exported, to any part of Europe, subject to a duty after the draw-back, of not less than 2% ad valorem. The above treaty, or provisions of said treaty, was rejected by President

1. Adams, Henry. History of the United States, 9 vol., New York, 1890. Scribners. Vol. 3. p. 143 ff.

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Jefferson because there was not included an express stipulation against future impressments. The British Commissioners, however, had given written assurance to the Americans against the future abuse of the practice of impressment.¹

On Nov. 21, 1806 Napoleon issued his famous Berlin decree which established the Continental System declaring that the British Isles were in a state of blockade and prohibiting commerce and intercourse with them. To further strengthen the enforcement of this plan Napoleon stated that all neutral and commercial countries should join in his commercial warfare against Great Britain.² As a result he confiscated not only English vessels, but all neutral vessels that traded with England. On Nov. 11, 1807 the British Orders in Council were issued³ stating that all ports and places of France and her allies, or where the British flag was excluded were to be placed in a state of blockade by his Majesty's ships and all trade in articles which were of the produce or manufacture of the said countries and colonies, should be deemed unlawful, and any vessel with such produce or manufactures on board should be confiscated. Napoleon reiterated with his Milan decree⁴ saying that any ship (no matter to what nation it belonged) that shall have permitted to being searched by an English ship, or to a voyage to England, or paid any tax whatever to the British government, shall thereby, and for that alone, be denationalized, to have forfeited the protection of its King, and to have become English property. Ships which were so denationalized, on entering a port of France, or being captured

1. Pitkin, Statistical View. p.376

2. Ibid., p. 377-378

3. Ibid., p. 381

4. Ibid., p. 381

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On Nov. 31, 1803 Napoleon issued his famous Berlin Decree which established the Continental System declaring that the British Isles were in a state of blockade and prohibiting commerce and intercourse with them. To further strengthen the enforcement of this plan Napoleon stated that all neutral and commercial countries should join in his commercial war-tare against Great Britain.² As a result he confiscated not only English vessels, but all neutral vessels that traded with England. On Nov. 11, 1807 the British Orders in Council were issued³ stating that all ports and places of France and her allies, or where the British flag was excluded were to be placed in a state of blockade by his Majesty's ships and all trade in articles which were of the produce or manufacture of the said countries and colonies, should be deemed unlawful, and any vessel with such produce or manufactures on board should be confiscated. Napoleon retaliated with his Milan Decree⁴ saying that any ship (no matter to what nation it belonged) that shall have permitted to being searched by an English ship, or to a voyage to England, or paid any tax whatever to the British Government, shall thereby, and for that alone, be denationalized, to have forfeited the protection of its King, and to have become English property. Ships which were so denationalized, on entering a port of France, or being captured

1. Patrick, Statistical View, p. 276
2. Ibid., p. 277-278
3. Ibid., p. 281
4. Ibid., p. 281

by French ships or privateers should be considered lawful prizes. On Dec. 22, 1807 President Jefferson issued his Embargo, which lasted for fifteen months and kept all vessels at home. As a result of this Embargo foreign commerce decreased in value in one year from \$108,000,000 to \$22,000,000.¹

There are several ways by which we may account for the \$22,000,000; namely, illicit trade with Canada and the West Indies. Not only was such illicit trade carried on but the Federal government also permitted it by the issuing of certificates which permitted trade to allow the states to obtain necessary supplies. It is indeed interesting to read about Gov. Sullivan issuing certificates in Massachusetts and as a result becoming embroiled in a controversy with Jefferson.² England also favored neutral ships and allowed them free sailing to British ports. Coasting trade--although closely supervised was permitted and there were many American-owned ships in foreign ports when the Embargo went into effect and these loaded their cargoes and sailed home later. Sears in his chapter on New England and the Embargo gives us a true view of conditions there and also gives a fine study of Jefferson. Jefferson, by nature, was a pacifist and his idea of the Embargo was that (1) it would safeguard our shipping; (2) it would bring European consumers to a realization of the folly of their governments in cutting them off from needed supplies.³ At a later date Jefferson believed in war, but he also foresaw that it would have to be a tri-angular war and

1. Paine, Old Merchant Marine. p. 109

2. Sears, Louis Martin. Jefferson and the Embargo. 1927. Duke University Press. Durham, North Carolina. p.78

3. Ibid., p. 3

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1. Paine, *Old Merchant Marine*, p. 103.
 2. Sears, *Louis Martin, Jefferson and the Embargo*, 1827. Duke University Press, Durham, North Carolina, p. 73.
 3. Ibid., p. 2.

as a consequence turned to the Embargo when he was advised that although the people of England wanted war, the manufacturers did not and would seek to prevent English government from the use of the decrees.¹ Jefferson's Embargo effected Massachusetts as follows:² the total exports of Massachusetts dropping from \$20,100,000 in 1807 to \$5,100,000 in 1808, while the shipping tonnage was 426,000 or about one-fifth of total United States tonnage. These losses in exports, about 75 per cent, were almost equally divided between domestic and foreign products. The tonnage of ship-building constructed in 1808 was only one-third of that of 1807, while the farmers felt the effect of the Embargo because of the drop in the demand for their products. Prices declined--as beans 41 per cent, potatoes 23 per cent, corn 55 per cent, while the prices of many imported necessities and luxuries increased by bounds. The only redeeming feature of the Embargo was that it protected the manufacturing interests better than a tariff. John Quincy Adams favored the Embargo, but only because his father had advocated it, while Josiah Quincy opposed it because he said the individual could better protect his own interests than the government.³ As a result of the paralysis of shipping, the Embargo Act was withdrawn and a Non-Intercourse Act substituted in 1808. This provided for the suspension of trade with Great Britain and France until the orders were repealed.⁴ Napoleon strongly opposed the Non-Intercourse Act and ordered all American ships in continental ports under his jurisdiction to be

1. Sears, Jefferson and the Embargo. p.55ff.

2. Adams, J.T., New England in Republic. p.251-252

3. Sears, Jefferson and the Embargo. p.143ff.

4. Paine, Old Merchant Marine. p.110

as a consequence turned to the Embargo when he was advised that although the people of England wanted war, the manufacturers did not and would seek to prevent English government from the use of the embargo.¹ Jefferson's Embargo effected Massachusetts as follows:² the total exports of Massachusetts dropping from \$30,100,000 in 1807 to \$5,100,000 in 1808, while the shipping tonnage was 488,000 or about one-fifth of total United States tonnage. These losses in exports, about 75 per cent, were almost equally divided between domestic and foreign products. The tonnage of ship-building constructed in 1808 was only one-third of that of 1807, while the farmers felt the effect of the Embargo because of the drop in the demand for their products. Prices declined--as beans 41 per cent, potatoes 35 per cent, corn 55 per cent, while the prices of many imported necessities and luxuries increased by pounds. The only redeeming feature of the Embargo was that it protected the manufacturing interests better than a tariff. John Quincy Adams favored the Embargo, but only because his father had advocated it, while Josiah Quincy opposed it because he said the individual could better protect his own interests than the Government.³ As a result of the paralysis of shipping, the Embargo Act was withdrawn and a Non-Intercourse Act substituted in 1809. This provided for the suspension of trade with Great Britain and France until the orders were repealed.⁴ Napoleon strongly opposed the Non-Intercourse Act and ordered all American ships in continental ports under his jurisdiction to be

1. Sears, Jefferson and the Embargo, p. 351.
 2. Adams, J. W., New England in Revolution, p. 251-252.
 3. Sears, Jefferson and the Embargo, p. 143.
 4. Faine, The Non-Intercourse Act, p. 110.

seized. On May 4, 1809, Napoleon issued his famous Rambouillet¹ decree ordering that all vessels under the flag of the United States, which counting from the twentieth of May, 1809, had entered or should enter into the ports of his Empire, or of his colonies, or of the countries occupied by his arms, should be seized and the products of the sale of the cargoes and vessels deposited in the surplus fund. It was now a question as to just how much effect, the various orders, decrees, and acts had and the United States was vainly trying to make treaties with either France or England by which all decrees and orders would be revoked. Finally, on the tenth of May, 1812, Barlow, the American minister received from Napoleon a copy of a decree, purported to have passed on the 28th of April, 1811, in which Napoleon declared "The decrees of Berlin and Milan are definitively, and to date, from the first day of November last, considered as not having existed."² Napoleon seemed to have definite assurance that the United States would declare war against England; unless the orders in Council were repealed. He was right, for war was declared June 18, five days before the decrees were repealed.³ It was highly improbable, however, that war could have been avoided, for there was a strong militant party in Congress declaring that impressment could be prevented only by war. The Committee on Foreign Relations in January 1813 declared that it considered impressment as the prime cause of the war.⁴ J.T. Adams gives figures showing that little impressment was done, however⁵--i.e. a committee

1. Pitkin. Statistical View. p.389

2. Ibid., p. 403

3. Ibid., p.403

4. Ibid., p. 405

5. Adams, J.T., New England in Republic. p.245-246

seized. On May 4, 1808, Napoleon issued his famous Rescript ordering that all vessels under the flag of the United States, which coming from the twentieth of May, 1808, had entered or should enter into the ports of his Empire, or of his colonies, or of the countries occupied by his arms, should be seized and the products of the sale of the cargoes and vessels deposited in the surplus fund. It was now a question as to just how much effect, the various orders, decrees, and acts had and the United States was vainly trying to make treaties with either France or England by which all decrees and orders would be revoked. Finally, on the tenth of May, 1812, Barlow, the American minister received from Napoleon a copy of a decree, purported to have passed on the 28th of April, 1811, in which Napoleon declared "The decrees of Berlin and Milan are definitively, and to date, from the first day of November last, considered as not having existed." Napoleon seemed to have definite assurance that the United States would declare war against England; unless the orders in Council were repealed. He was right, for war was declared June 18, five days before the decrees were repealed.⁵ It was highly improbable, however, that war could have been avoided, for there was a strong military party in Congress declaring that impressment could be prevented only by war. The Committee on Foreign Relations in January 1812 declared that it considered impressment as the prime cause of the war.⁶ J. T. Adams gives figures showing that little impressment was done, however⁷—i.e. a committee

1. British Statistical View, p. 282
2. Ibid., p. 403
3. Ibid., p. 403
4. Ibid., p. 403
5. Adams, J. T., New England in Republic, p. 242-243

of Massachusetts State Senate said only 157 had been impressed from the whole state, while people of Salem claimed that more than that number had been impressed from Salem alone, and the United States government claimed over 6,000 American sailors had been impressed. The whole question resolves into the United States considering it an injustice and against a right of personal security, while as Mahan¹ points out, England saw no reason why she should give up the right of impressment and search because a new nation decided it should be done, whereas France and other old enemies accepted it as a matter of course.

The Federalists of New England were successful in having the Embargo repealed, and yet in offering non-intercourse as the alternative they made war a result--for England and France could get supplies from this country in neutral ships and also they would capture American ships and subject them to indignities in their Admiralty courts. The Embargo would have been a better preventive of war, would have prevented loss of ships, have kept England and France from getting supplies and would have served as a real world court if given a true trial of say two to three years.²

1. Mahan, Captain Alfred Thayer. Sea Power in its Relation to War of 1812. Boston, 1819. 2 volumes. Volume 1. p.114ff.
2. Sears, Jefferson and the Embargo. p.195-196

CHAPTER II

COMMERCE 1815-1820

TRENDS OF TRADE AND PLACES WITH WHICH TRADE WAS CARRIED ON

As Hunt¹ says after the cessation of the war, new vigor was infused into every department of commerce, with the most emphasis being placed on domestic commerce. This new vigor came as a result of the colonization of the new states of the West, increase of new subjects of cultivation, especially cotton, the increase of population, plus the establishment of a compact, well-organized government affording free scope to national enterprise of all sorts. All these things together tended to advance agriculture, manufacture, and commerce. The aid in the development of commerce was due to the growth and demand of the people for luxuries which had to be imported from Europe and which drew wealth from the country in the same proportion as it increased our commerce. One is reminded of McMaster's words which have been mentioned before--namely, the overflow of English goods, the doing away with of the super-cargoes, and the inability of most merchants to pay for the huge supply of goods which they had imported. The growth of manufactures and agriculture did aid commerce according to Hunt in the following ways:² Agriculture's relationship to the carrying trade--(a) the cultivation of cotton, causing it to be used in large quantities; (b) the wide development of new lands resulting in the growth of wheat and grain, also rice, tobacco, beef horses, mules, butter and sheep; (c) the development of and

1. Hunt, Merchant Magazine. vol.V 1841. p.46

2. Ibid., p.46

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¹ J. Hunt, *Merchants Magazine*, Vol. V 1841, p. 46.² *Ibid.*, p. 46.

deriving of the products of the forests--i.e. lumber, skins, furs, dyes, bark, pitch, tar, rosin, turpentine, and ginseng; (d) many domestic exports were derived from the sea--i.e. whale and spermaceti, oils and candles, cod, mackerel, herring, shad and salmon, salted and packed in barrels; (e) last but not least, cotton and woolen cloths manufactured as a direct result of the growth of manufactured articles from agricultural products. Other manufactured articles which were exported include soap and tallow candles, leather boots and shoes, hats, wax, spirits from grains--i.e. beer, ale and porter, snuff, tobacco, linseed oil, cordage, iron, cotton, flax and hemp, umbrellas and molasses.¹

It is not to be denied that there was an increase in trade after the war and this increase is reflected somewhat in the development of several new and interesting enterprises. For example, Frederick Tudor, a Boston merchant had sent a few small shipments of ice to the West Indies before the war. After the war he expanded his project and secured a monopoly of the New England ice trade for Havana, and his shipments were extended to Charleston, Savannah, and New Orleans. The ice shrunk greatly in its voyage, yet despite its great loss of size it sold at high prices and made good profits as the demand for it was great. Tudor's greatest feat in this shipment of ice was the sending of a cargo to Calcutta. He carefully packed the ice and on its arrival in Calcutta it sold like wildfire. As a result of this sale of ice, a brisk trade arose between India and Boston for ice, which lasted for nearly thirty years and gave Boston a monopoly of all traffic in trade.² The greatest

1. Pitkin, Statistical View p. 139

2. Marvin, W. L., American Merchant Marine p. 184

deriving of the products of the forests--i.e. lumber, skins, furs, eyes, bark, pitch, tar, rosin, turpentine, and glass; (d) many domestic exports were derived from the sea--i.e. whale and spermaceti, oils and candles, cod, mackerel, herring, shad

and salmon, salted and packed in barrels; (e) last but not least, cotton and woolen cloths manufactured as a direct result of the growth of manufactured articles from agricultural products.

Other manufactured articles which were exported include soap and tallow candles, leather boots and shoes, hats, wax, spirits from grain--i.e. beer, ale and port, snuff, tobacco, linseed oil, cordage, iron, cotton, flax and hemp, umbrellas and valises.

It is not to be denied that there was an increase in trade after the war and this increase is reflected somewhat in the development of several new and interesting enterprises.

For example, Frederick Tudor, a Boston merchant had sent a few small shipments of ice to the West Indies before the war. After the war he expanded his project and secured a monopoly of the New England ice trade for Havana, and his shipments were ex-

tended to Charleston, Savannah, and New Orleans. The ice arrived greatly in its voyage, yet despite the great loss of size it sold at high prices and made good profits as the demand for it was great. Tudor's greatest feat in this shipment of ice was the sending of a cargo to Calcutta. He carefully packed the ice and on its arrival in Calcutta it sold like wildfire. As a result of this sale of ice, a brisk trade arose between India and Boston for ice, which lasted for nearly thirty years and gave Boston a monopoly of all traffic in trade. The greatest

revival however was that of the East India trade, and this in a way really is the story of Salem. It was Cleveland and Delano who showed the way to the Salem people in the trade with the far East, and it was the people of Salem who carried on and completed this trade. As a consequence, let us describe the East Indies trade by the story of Salem.

Marvin says that in old Salem "well named the city of peace from its civilizing commerce" the spirit of American commerce in its adventurous aspects found its highest and noblest embodiments. The first American vessels to the Cape of Good Hope sailed from Salem, as did the first vessels to open up trade with Hindustan, Java, Sumatra, and with the aid of the Dutch Japan. Salem ships were among the first to arrive at the West Coast of Africa, the Fiji Islands, Madagascar, New Holland, New Zealand, and even South America.¹ Salem's Commerce in 1700 was described as follows by Felt² "Dry merchantable codfish for the markets of Spain and Portugal and the Straits. Refuse fish, lumber, horses and provisions for the West Indies; returns made directly to England are sugar, molasses, cotton, wool, log-wood and Braelett wood for which we depend on the West Indies. Our own produce, a considerable quantity of whale and fish oil, whalebone, furs, deer, elk, and bear skin, are annually sent to England. We have much shipping here and freights are low." In 1768 Salem had 7,913 tons of shipping; in 1771, 9,223 tons while during the Revolution the tonnage naturally ceased to grow, although under the able leadership

1. Marvin, American Merchant Marine. p.195

2. Felt, Joseph B. Annals of Salem

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of Elias Hasket Derby, 158 armed vessels were equipped to cruise against the enemy. In 1791, the tonnage was 9,031 less than that of 1771, but between the years of 1791 and 1797 the merchant tonnage increased to 24,862 and at the time Jefferson's Embargo was put into effect, Salem possessed 252 vessels with a combined tonnage of 43,570.¹ In June, 1784, Derby sent his ship "Light Horse" to St. Petersburg with a load of sugar and as a consequence, one of the essential parts of an East Indies trip was founded. That is to say, the people of the East Indies did not desire particularly the home products of the farms, fisheries, and forests, and as a result ships bound out beyond the Cape of Good Hope carried as part of their freight European manufactures. As a consequence the smaller ships--i.e. brigs and barks--collected iron, duck and hemp from Gothenburg, Archangel or Kronstadt and also miscellaneous goods from England. This freight idea was not that as we think of it today--freight was carried not for others but to carry out the mercantile affairs of the owners themselves. Thus, an individual merchant would furnish the ship with an outward freight and this, through its sale in a foreign port, would procure a homeward cargo which the merchant would sell from his own ware-house. This procedure needed clever men and as a result there originated the "half-lay" or "square-halves" system.² That is the ship-owner or several ship-owners provided the ship and equipment, while the captain hired the crew and paid the running expenses. The gain, if any, was split between the owners, captains, and crews. If there was no cargo

1. Marvin, American Merchant Marine p. 196-197

2. Robert E. Peabody, The Log of the Grand Turks. Houghton, Mifflin, Boston, New York. 1926. 4 chps. 6 appendix 247 pp. p.3

of Misses Hackett Derry, 158 armed vessels were equipped to cruise against the enemy. In 1791, the tonnage was 2,031 less than that of 1771, but between the years of 1791 and 1797 the merchant tonnage increased to 34,868 and at the time Jefferson's embargo was put into effect, Salem possessed 333 vessels with a combined tonnage of 43,370. In June, 1784, Derry sent his ship "Light Horse" to St. Petersburg with a load of sugar and as a consequence, one of the essential parts of an East India trip was founded. That is to say, the people of the East Indies did not desire particularly the home products of the time, fisheries, and forests, and as a result ships bound out beyond the Cape of Good Hope carried as part of their freight European manufactures. As a consequence the smaller ships--i.e. brigs and bark--carried iron, duck and hemp from Gottenburg, Anchorage or Kronstadt and also miscellaneous goods from England. This freight was not that as we think of it today--freight was carried not for others but to carry out the mercantile affairs of the owners themselves. Thus, an individual merchant would furnish the ship with an outward freight and this, through its sale in a foreign port, would procure a homeward cargo which the merchant would sell from his own warehouse. This procedure needed of course men and as a result there originated the "half-pay" or "spare-half-pay" system. That is the ship-owner or several ship-owners provided the ship and equipment, while the captain hired the crew and paid the running expenses. The gain, if any, was split between the owners, captain, and crew. If there was no cargo

or freight, the captain and super-cargo were provided with a large amount of silver bullion, with which the return cargo could be bought outright.

As may be expected, voyages which required such ingenuity and skill resulted in many adventurous and mysterious trips for new cargoes. One of the most interesting voyages was that of Captain Jonathan Carnes. In 1793 while on a voyage, he heard that it was possible to find the wild pepper on the North coast of Sumatra.¹ As a consequence, on his return home, he confided this news to a Salem merchant, Jonathan Peele, who, in 1795, fitted out a schooner, the "Rajah", of 134 tons with a crew of ten men and Carnes as captain. The "Rajah" was gone for eighteen months and returned then with a cargo of bulk pepper which netted its owners 700 per cent profit. One of the worst trades which developed was that with the West Coast of Africa. The staple products of this trade were rum, gun-powder, and tobacco. The negroes on the West Coast were eager to trade for these and exchanged in return hides, palm oils, gold dust, and gum copal.² Today, we are recognized as great coffee-drinkers and the story of how coffee was brought to Salem is indeed interesting. In 1798, the ship "Recovery" left Salem and returned three years later in 1801 with a cargo of fragrant berries which made Mocha famous throughout the world. This trade developed rapidly and in 1805, two million pounds of Mocha coffee were landed in Salem. Another interesting phase of Salem voyages was the hiring of Salem ships by portuguese and Dutch merchants³

1. Marvin, Merchant Marine. p. 201

2. Ibid., p.202

3. Ibid., p.203ff.

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As may be expected, voyages which required such ingenuity and skill resulted in many adventures and myster-

ious trips for new cargoes. One of the most interesting voyages was that of Captain Jonathan Garner. In 1783 while on a voyage, he heard that it was possible to find the wild pepper on the North coast of Sumatra.¹ As a consequence, on his return home, he confided this news to a Salem merchant,

Jonathan Pelee, who, in 1785, fitted out a schooner, the "Hatch", of 134 tons with a crew of ten men and Garner as captain. The "Hatch" was gone for eighteen months and re-turned then with a cargo of black pepper which netted its owners 700 per cent profit. One of the worst trades which

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In 1795, the ship "Recovery" left Salem and returned three years later in 1801 with a cargo of fragrant berries which made Moore famous throughout the world. This trade developed rapidly and in 1805, two million pounds of Moore coffee were landed in Salem. Another interesting phase of Salem voyages

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1. Marvin, Merchant Marine, p. 201
2. Ibid., p. 202
3. Ibid., p. 203

who were privileged to trade with Japan. As early as 1799, the ship "Franklin" of Boston, with Captain James Devereux of Salem as captain, was hired by the Dutch East India Company to take the annual freights to and from Japan. In 1801 the Salem ship "Margaret" was similarly employed. As a consequence of this, the people and trade of Japan became known early to Salem men, and as Marvin points out, it was not strange that after Perry's trip to Japan in 1853, the first vessel to clear from an American port direct for Japan was the Salem bark "Edward Koppisch." The duties collected from Salem merchants on their transactions from 1801 to 1810 amounted to \$7,272,000.

Another aspect of Salem trade was that which was opened up with the Philippines. In 1796 the Derby ship "Astrea" with Captain Henry Prince¹ in command found her way to the Philippines and secured there a cargo consisting of 750,000 pounds of sugar, 63,000 pounds of pepper and 29,000 pounds of indigo. This cargo paid a duty of \$24,020 upon its arrival in Salem and started a great and profitable commerce for Salem merchants were quick to discover the fine qualities of Manila hemp, which were unsurpassed for cordage. One may well imagine the delight of visitors to Salem as they wandered in and out of its warehouses. Here were interesting goods and articles from all over the world. For example,² there was hemp from Luzon, pepper from Sumatra, coffee from Arabia, palm oil from the West coast of Africa, cotton from Bombay, duck and iron from the Baltic, tallow from Madagascar, salt from Cadiz,

1. Morison, Samuel Eliot. Maritime History of Massachusetts Boston 1921. Houghton, Mifflin. p.94
2. Marvin, Merchant Marine. p.205

who were privileged to trade with Japan. As early as 1793, the ship "Franklin" of Boston, with Captain James Beverux of Salem as captain, was hired by the Dutch East India Company to take the annual freight to and from Japan. In 1801 the Salem ship "Margaret" was similarly employed. As a consequence of this, the people and trade of Japan became known early to Salem men, and as Marvin points out, it was not strange that after Perry's trip to Japan in 1853, the first vessel to clear from an American port direct for Japan was the Salem bark "Edward Koppisch." The duties collected from Salem merchants on their transactions from 1801 to 1810 amounted to \$7,375,000. Another aspect of Salem trade was that which was opened up with the Philippines. In 1798 the Derby ship "Astrea" with Captain Henry Prince¹ in command found her way to the Philippines and secured there a cargo consisting of 750,000 pounds of sugar, 35,000 pounds of pepper and 35,000 pounds of indigo. This cargo paid a duty of \$34,080 upon its arrival in Salem and started a great and profitable commerce for Salem merchants were quick to discover the fine qualities of Manila hemp, which were unsurpassed for cordage. One may well imagine the delight of visitors to Salem as they wandered in and out of its warehouses. Here were interesting goods and articles from all over the world. For example,² there was hemp from Japan, pepper from Sumatra, coffee from Arabia, palm oil from the West coast of Africa, cotton from Bombay, duck and iron from the Baltic, tallow from Madagascar, salt from Cadiz,

1. Norton, Samuel Elliot. Maritime History of Massachusetts
Boston 1921. Houghton, Mifflin. p. 24
2. Marvin, Merchant Marine. p. 303

wine from Portugal and the Madeiras, figs, raisins, and almonds from the Mediterranean, teas and silk from China, sugar, rum and molasses from the West Indies, ivory and gum-copal (used in varnishes and paints) from Zanzibar, rubber, hides and wool from South America, whale oil from the Arctic and Antarctic, and sperm from the South Seas. Imagine the visitor going in and out of the warehouses, looking enviously and longingly at the different goods; is it any wonder that to be an East India man, a Salem sailor, or a super-cargo was the desire of all.

In 1807 when the Embargo was declared, Salem had 182 vessels engaged in foreign commerce while at the close of the war in 1815 there were only 52 Salem vessels employed in foreign trade.¹ The Embargo had a distressing effect on commerce, and the War of 1812 completed what the Embargo had begun. Thus, in 1812 the deep-sea vessels of Salem numbered 126 vessels, of which 58 were Indiamen.² This was not such a large decline from the figures of 1807, yet it shows in what direction commerce was going in Salem. In 1816 42 vessels were employed in the Far East trade, while in 1817, 32 full-rigged ships, two barks and eighteen brigs sailed in this trade.³ The commerce of Salem was beginning to decline at this time. This was not the condition in Salem alone, but it was true of American shipping as a whole. The Reciprocity agreement which was discussed in the previous chapter gives a fine account of why trade diminished. Reciprocity replaced protection and the system of discriminating customs duties and tonnage dues was not as beneficial as

1. Morison, Maritime History of Massachusetts. p.217

2. Marvin, Merchant Marine. p.215

3. Ibid., p.215

wine from Portugal and the Mediterranean, figs, raisins, and almonds from the Mediterranean, teas and silk from China, sugar, rum and molasses from the West Indies, ivory and gum-copal (used in varnishes and paints) from Sumatra, rubber, hides and wool from South America, whale oil from the Arctic and Antarctic, and sperms from the South Seas. Imagine the visitor going in and out of the warehouses, looking anxiously and longingly at the different goods; is it any wonder that to be an East India man, a Salem sailor, or a super-cargo was the desire of all.

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1. Morison, Maritime History of Massachusetts, p. 217.
2. Morison, Merchant Marine, p. 215.
3. Ibid., p. 215.

outright protection. In 1821 there were 126 Salem vessels engaged in overseas trade, and the figures in 1833 were reduced to 111 and a constant diminishing is noted, so that by the time 1900 had arrived, Salem had no vessel registered for deep-sea commerce.

One well may ask why did Salem achieve the greatness it did. Its harbor to be sure is good, yet not outstanding; there were no great supplies of timber for ship-building for this was early exhausted; the people of Salem possessed no great wealth and there was not a huge supply of goods obtainable for use as exports. The secret of its success is well said to be found in its merchant class. These men of old Puritan stock, had a wide and vivid imagination, believed in their own greatness and will to do and also in the will and ability to do of their fellow men. This will to conquer the world and to bring its treasures to Salem is well described by a quotation Marvin gives of the Reverend George Bachelor. Bachelor wrote as follows: "In those days crews were made up of Salem boys, every one of whom expected to become an East India merchant. When a captain was asked at Manila how he continued to find his way into the teeth of a North-east monsoon by mere dead reckoning, he replied that he had a crew of twelve men, any one of whom could take and work a lunar observation as well for all practical purposes as Sir Isaac Newton himself. . . . This crew had in Nathaniel Bowditch, an uncommon super-cargo, but it would be difficult now to find a crew of common sailors who, even under such a teacher, would willingly master the mysteries of tangents

outright protection. In 1881 there were 186 Salem vessels engaged in overseas trade, and the figures in 1885 were rounded to 111 and a constant diminishing is noted, so that by the time 1900 had arrived, Salem had no vessel registered for deep-sea commerce.

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and secants, dip and refraction, sines and cosines."

One of the most marvelous of trading voyages was that which was made famous by Boston boats. It was not a trade peculiar to Boston--as well as the East India trade was not peculiar to Salem--but it was a trade which was dominated by Boston. This was the trade with Canton and a brief description of the development and course of this trade is well worthwhile. The Canton trade was an involved one--for it resulted in the development of the Northwest fur trade, the fur-seal fisheries and the Hawaiian trade all being means to an end--namely, carrying on trade with Canton. We can well describe the history of this trade by the history of a given ship--the ship "Astrae" owned by H.E. Derby and commanded by Capt. James Magee, Fr., with Thomas H. Perkins, super-cargo. This ship was one of fifteen American vessels in Canton in 1789. There follows a list of her manifest-cargo¹ "Thus, Tenney and Brown, of Newbury, sent '9 kegs of snuff' and a note in the margin of the manifest (cargo) tells captain Magee that '1/c of the net proceeds you are to credit to H.E. Derby's account for freight--the other 2/3 to layout on account of Tenney and Brown in light goods; opposite the item 'phaeton and harness complete with saddles and bridles, etc., is a note saying

This belongs to Folger Pope....the net proceeds are to be credited to H.E.D's account, as friend Derby is to have the use of the money for freight. David Sears sent 'boxes containing \$15,000, 16 casks of ginseng, 5,570 pounds.' This

1. Spears, John R.--Story of American Merchant Marine. New York. 1910. Macmillan Co. p.109

and accounts, also and relations, since and colonies."

One of the most numerous of trading voyages was that which was made famous by Boston boats. It was not a trade peculiar to Boston--as well as the East India trade was not peculiar to Salem--but it was a trade which was dominated by Boston. This was the trade with Canton and a brief description of the development and course of this trade is well worthwhile. The Canton trade was an involved one--for it resulted in the development of the Northwest fur trade, the fur-seal fisheries and the Hawaiian trade all being means to an end--namely, carrying on trade with Canton. We can well describe the history of this trade by the history of a given ship--the ship "Astrae" owned by H.E. Derby and commanded by Capt. James Magee, Jr., with Thomas H. Perkins, super-cargo. This ship was one of fifteen American vessels in Canton in 1782. There follows a list of her manifest-cargo: "Tann, Tanney and brown of Newbury, sent 19 kegs of snuff" and a note in the margin of the manifest (cargo) tells captain Magee that 1/3 of the net proceeds you are to credit to H.E. Derby's account for freight--the other 2/3 to lay out on account of Tanney and Brown in light goods; opposite the item 'pansetion and harness complete with saddles and bridles, etc., is a note saying This belongs to Folger Pope.... the net proceeds are to be credited to H.E.D.'s account, as friend Derby is to have the use of the money for freight. David Sears sent boxes containing \$15,000, 18 cases of glass, 5,570 pounds. This

at 1/5 for freight. William Cabot sent a box 'containing 21 pieces plate, weight 255 ox. 16 dwts, 12 grs. Rums, wines, beer, fish, flour' 598 firkins butter--32,055 lbs. and spermaceti candles were conspicuous items in the manifest."

The early voyages to Canton were direct with stops at the Cape Verde islands or the Cape of Good Hope to take on provisions; later, however, the vessels stopped at the various islands on their way out--for example the islands of Madeira, Madras, Pondichery, Batavia, Calcutta, and Bombay. The stops at Calcutta and Bombay were made to get cargoes of Indian cotton which was in demand in Canton.¹ Likewise at first the voyages home were direct, but later stops were made at all European ports from Genoa to St. Petersburg. Canton teas were sold at Hamburg or at Seghorn; its silks in Spain and its Nankeens in France.²

It would be well I believe if we digressed for the moment and discussed trade with those places which were directly connected with the Canton trade--i.e., the Northwest fur trade, trade with the Hawaiins, the South Sea islands and the Seal fisheries. The Northwest fur trade resulted through the discovery of the value of the rich furs of the sea-otters which abounded off the Northwest coast. These skins could be bought from the natives for a few trinkets and were sold at a premium³ in Canton due to the great demand for them. The Chinese people delighted in the purchase of the sea-otter fur because they used it extensively in their adornment and

1. Dulles, Foster Rhea. The Old China Trade. Boston, 1930. Houghton Mifflin Co. p.39

2. Ibid. p.39

3. Morison, G.E.--Maritime History of Massachusetts p.57

at 1/3 for freight. William Gabor sent a box containing 21 pieces plate, weight 225 oz. 12 dwt, 12 grs. Rums, wines, beer, etc. 338 flasks butter--32,000 lbs. and 320000 candles were conspicuous items in the manifest." The early voyages to Canton were direct with stops at the Cape Verde Islands or the Cape of Good Hope to take on provisions; later, however, the vessels stopped at the various islands on their way out--for example the islands of Madagasc, Madagascar, Pondicherry, Batavia, Calcutta, and Bombay. The stops at Calcutta and Bombay were made to get cargoes of Indian cotton which was in demand in Canton. Likewise at first the voyages home were direct, but later stops were made at all European ports from Canton to St. Petersburg. Canton teas were sold at Hamburg or at Leghorn; the silks in Spain and the Hankens in France.²

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1. Dallas, Foster Russ. The Old China Trade. Boston, 1830.
2. Ibid. p. 32.
3. Norton, G. K. Maritime History of Massachusetts p. 27.

it brought about the development of one of the most important branches of commerce. One of the first voyages made was that of the ship Columbia, Captain Rob't Kendrick commanding. It sailed around Cape Horn up to Nostka sound. The ingenuity of the traders is shown for they fashioned chisels out of scrap-iron--making them about eight inches long and using them for currency. A prime sea otter skin was worth six to eight chisels, a blanket or a looking glass. Six furs were trading equipment enough to be exchanged for a musket.¹ The Columbia carried the American flag around the world for the first time and disposed of its furs for 350 chests of Bonea tea. This trade with the Northwest coast was very exciting and full of adventure, plus the added pleasant feature that it was very, very profitable. The dangers were to be found in the irregular and rugged coast-line, which had many reefs, sunken rocks, strong tides, and no bottom for a good anchorage. The feature which was worse, however, was that of Indian attack. Many examples can be cited of this, but the mere mentioning of one sufficient for our purpose. In 1803, the natives in and around Notka sound attacked the ship Boston, Captain Salter and slaughtered all the ships crew but two.² This is of course an extreme case but let us quote the words of Captain Kendrick to Gray, "treat the natives with respect wherever you go. Cultivate friendship with them as much as possible and take nothing from them but what you pay them for according to a fair agreement and not suffer your people to affront them

1. Dulles--Old China Trade. p.54

2. Morison--Maritime History of Massachusetts p.55

it brought about the development of one of the most important branches of commerce. One of the first voyages made was that of the ship Columbia, Captain Robert Kendrick commanding. It sailed around Cape Horn up to Alaska sound. The ingenuity of the traders is shown for they fashioned chains out of soap-stone--making them about eight inches long and using them for currency. A prime sea otter skin was worth six to eight chains, a blanket or a looking glass. Six furs were trading equipment enough to be exchanged for a musket.¹ The Columbia carried the American flag around the world for the first time and disposed of its furs for 330 chests of bones tea. This trade with the Northwest coast was very exciting and full of adventure, give the added pleasant feature that it was very, very profitable. The dangers were to be found in the irregular and rugged coast-line, which had many reefs, sunken rocks, strong tides, and no bottom for a good anchorage. The feature which was worse, however, was that of Indian attack. Many examples can be cited of this, but the mere mentioning of one sufficient for our purpose. In 1803, the natives in and around Norton sound attacked the ship Boston, Captain Salter and slaughtered all the ships crew but two.² This is of course an extreme case but let us quote the words of Captain Kendrick to Gray, "treat the natives with respect wherever you go. Cultivate friendship with them as much as possible and take nothing from them but what you pay them for according to a fair agreement and not suffer your people to affront them

1. DeLancey--Old Coast Trade, p. 64.
2. Norton--Maritime History of Massachusetts, p. 58.

or treat them ill."¹ The trade was interesting and variable because the Indians were constantly changing their minds. As a consequence Cargoes were constantly being varied and here is a brief mention of some items used--colored blankets, beads, trinkets, chisels, knives, nails, molasses, and sugar, with occasionally rum,² but this was only taken at rare intervals. The trade diminished due to the fact that in the War of 1812 many American vessels were captured and held by the British and also due to the fact that the furs were getting scarce and the Indians were demanding high prices. The fur trade to make a profit was dependent to a great extent on cheap barter and the decline in furs and exorbitant demands of the Indians meant a slow, lingering death which was hastened with the advent of the War of 1812. In conclusion I will mention the quotations which Dulles gives of the importations of sea-otter furs into Canton from 1790 to 1812--and 1812 to 1834. 1790-1812 the average annual imports amounted to about 12,000 furs a year; from 1812 to 1834 the average annual imports amounted to about 12,000 furs a year; from 1812 to 1834 the average annual imports amounted to about 2,000 a year.

The trade with the Hawaiiin islands was probably begun by the Columbia, with Rob't Gray captain, which touched at Hawaii in August, 1789 on her first voyage around the world.³ The Columbia was at anchor for twenty-four days and undoubtedly used the time to stock up with fresh vegetables, water and other provisions.; the vegetables which were abundant in the island

1. Morison--Maritime History of Massachusetts p.55

2. Dulles--Old China Trade. p.65

3. Morison, Samuel Eliot. Boston Traders in the Hawaiiin Islands. 1789-1823. Mass. Hist. Society Proceedings. 1920-1921 Vol.54. Published by Society. p.12

of treat them ill.¹ The trade was interesting and variable because the Indians were constantly changing their minds. As a consequence cargoes were constantly being varied and here is a brief mention of some items used--colored blankets, beads, trinkets, chains, knives, nails, molasses, and sugar, with occasionally rum,² but this was only taken at rare intervals. The trade diminished due to the fact that in the War of 1812 many American vessels were captured and held by the British and also due to the fact that the furs were getting scarce and the Indians were demanding high prices. The fur trade to make a profit was dependent to a great extent on cheap barter and the decline in furs and exorbitant demands of the Indians meant a slow, lingering death which was hastened with the advent of the War of 1812. In conclusion I will mention the quotations which Dulles gives of the importations of sea-otter furs into Canton from 1790 to 1812--and 1812 to 1834. 1790-1812 the average annual imports amounted to about 12,000 furs a year; from 1812 to 1834 the average annual imports amounted to about 13,000 furs a year; from 1812 to 1834 the average annual imports amounted to about 2,000 a year.

The trade with the Hawaiian Islands was probably begun by the Columbia, with Robert Gray captain, which touched at Hawaii in August, 1792 on her first voyage around the world. The Columbia was at anchor for twenty-four days and undoubtedly used the time to stock up with fresh vegetables, water and other provisions; the vegetables which were abundant in the island

1. Morrison--Maritime History of Massachusetts p. 55
2. Dulles--Old China Trade p. 55
3. Morrison, Samuel Elliot. Boston Traders in the Hawaiian Islands 1782-1832. Mass. Hist. Society Proceedings. 1930-1931 Vol. 57. Published by Society. p. 12

yams, tams; also fruits; i.e. musk melons, sugar cane, salt, bread fruit and of great importance fresh water.¹ One could buy a good-sized hog according to Morison for five to ten spikes. The real hero of the Hawaiian trade, however, was Captain Kendrick for he discovered that Hawaii produced much Sandalwood and as a consequence since this was in great demand in China he was a hero. Outside of sandalwood there were no other goods, except pearls, taken from Hawaii. The vessels stopped for cargoes of sandalwood, got fresh provisions and sailed for Canton. The principal goods which were brought to Hawaii were fire-arms, ammunitions, European clothes, table-cloths and rum. The imports of sandalwood into Canton² were as follows: from 1804-1805, 900 piculs of 133 1/3 pounds each; from 1811-1812, 19,036 piculs; from 1817-1818, 15,825 piculs; from 1811 to 1823 about 2,000 annually. King Kamehameha I, in order to conserve it, put sandalwood traffic under restraint in 1820-1821 and as a result it fell off about 6,000 piculs annually in those two years. A picul averaged 133 1/3 pounds and the price varied from \$8 to \$10 a picul. Sandalwood was used in China for incense and the making of fancy articles. The various kings with the exception of Kamehameha did little to preserve the sandalwood and the natives were kept busy collecting it. As a consequence the best years of the trade were from 1810 to 1825 because by that time the Chinese or Canton market was flooded and there was no demand for it. Thus, a new aspect in the life of the

1. Morison--Boston Traders in Hawaii, p.12
2. Ibid., p.14

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to Hawaii were live-animals, mammals, European clothes,
cups, plates and tea. The imports of Gambelwood into Canton
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islands began after 1820 for then missionaries arrived to teach the people the better side of life and this bringing in of civilization resulted in a demand for American goods.

In 1810 another adventurous and profitable trade was opened up by the bark "Active," Captain Richardson,¹ with the Fiji Islands and the islands of the South Seas; i.e. Marquesas, Guam, Tahiti, Samoa, etc., The most peculiar part of this trade especially with the Fijis was that founded on Beche de mer. In the Fiji Islands there grows abundantly a most peculiar sea-slug which is highly valued as food in the Orient. This sea-slug or beche de mer is used by the Chinese in making soup and is said to be very palatable. The work of gathering up the sea-slugs, drying and preparing them for market was not only difficult and tedious, but also drawn out. It was many months before a proper cargo was secured and then most vessels would either sail direct to Canton and exchange the beche-de-mer for tea or else they would go to Manila and exchange it for hemp and sugar. The trade with the South Sea Islands was not confined alone to beche-de-mer, however, for there were many products which were in demand in Canton. For example, sandalwood (which cost about a cent a pound and sold for thirty-four cents in Canton), tortoise shell, mother of pearl, edible birds nests, and sharks fins. Beche-de-mer was cured by boiling it in pot-houses on the beach and then drying it and storing it away in matting bags.² The chief goods or products which were carried to the islands were simply an assortment

1. Marvin--Merchant Marine, p.208

2. Dulles--Old China Trade, p.96

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of trinkets, iron tools, whales teeth, hatchets, knives, glass bottles, calicos, needles, nails and looking glasses. The trade was hazardous both because of the wild coral reefs, unchartered shores and treachery and cannibalism of the natives.

The seal fisheries were established mainly in the Falklands, Patagonia, Masafuera and the waters south of Cape Horn. In the year 1784, Lady Haley, the sister of John Wilkes, the famous English reformer sent the ship States to the Falklands for hair-seal skins and sea-elephant oil and in addition the crew brought back about 13,000 fur seal skins.¹ The demand in the United States was slight, but when the skins were taken to Canton, they sold at an average of \$5 apiece compared with 50¢ in this country. The profits of seal skins were enormous, although the prices were always fluctuating from 50¢ up to \$3 and \$5. Profits of necessity had to be large because the voyages lasted from two to three years and the time was spent off cold, barren islands. Shore gangs or crews went on the islands, killed the seals, skinned them, scraped off the blubber and then cured the furs by pegging them on the sand to be cured either by the sun or salt. The living conditions were indeed terrible for the men were forced to live in rude huts, and got most of their food by shooting wild hogs, geese, and goats. The crews were often marooned due to the fact that their vessels left them to go after more seals and did not return. When such an event took place the molasses, bread and coffee left behind proved very meagre and although

1. Dulles--Old China Trade, p.82

of blankets, iron tools, whale teeth, hatchets, knives, glass bottles, calicos, needles, nails and looking glasses. The trade was hazardous both because of the wild coral reefs, uncharted shores and treachery and cannibalism of the natives. The seal fisheries were established mainly in the Falklands, Patagonia, Massachusetts and the waters south of Cape Horn. In the year 1784, Lady Haley, the sister of John Wilkes, the famous English reformer sent the ship Staves to the Falklands for hair-seal skins and sea-elephant oil and in addition the crew brought back about 13,000 fur seal skins. The demand in the United States was slight, but when the skins were taken to Canton, they sold at an average of \$3 apiece compared with 50¢ in this country. The profits of seal skins were enormous, although the prices were always fluctuating from 50¢ up to \$3 and \$5. Profits of necessity had to be large because the voyages lasted from two to three years and the time was spent off cold, barren islands. Shore gangs or crews went on the islands, killed the seals, skinned them, scraped off the blubber and then cured the furs by pegging them on the sand to be cured either by the sun or salt. The living conditions were indeed terrible for the men were forced to live in rude huts, and for most of their food by shooting wild dogs, geese, and goats. The crews were often marooned due to the fact that their vessels left them to go after more seals and did not return. When such an event took place the marooned crews and coffee left behind proved very meagre and although

the sailors sailed on shares, there was considerable mutiny, rioting and desertion. The seal trade lasted until the War of 1812 practically ruined it, together with the fact that the seals were practically annihilated. It revived temporarily in 1818 due to the discovery of the people of Stoughton of Palmers Island and the South Shetlands, but the trade was gone and the skins were now for the most part sent to the United States.

The goods taken to Canton for trade were sea-otter and land-otter, beaver, fox and seal skins, ebony, copper, cochineal, sandalwood, steel and brimstone, lead, quicksilver, betel-nut, ginseng, opium, iron and silver dollars and specie. The goods taken from Canton were largely tea; i.e. Bohea, Congo, Sonchong, Hyson Skin, Imperial, and Tokay, cassia, chinaware, camphor, sugar rhubarb, silks, sewing silk, pepper, sugar, candy, anise-seed, saltpeter, nankeens, white lead, etc. A merchant usually gave letters of instruction to the captain and super-cargo and I will quote from Derby's letters of instruction to the captains and super-cargo of the "Astrae"¹ Captain John Magee and super-cargo Thomas H. Perkins. "Make the best of your way for Batavia, and on your arrival there you will dispose of such a part of the cargo as you think may be most for my interest. I think you had best sell a few casks of the most ordinary ginseng, if you can get one dollar a pound for it. If you find the price of sugar to be low you will then take into the ship as much of the best white

1. Speare--Story of American Merchant Marine, p.110-111-112.

the sailors sailed on wharves, there was considerable hunting, fishing and gathering. The seal trade lasted until the War of 1812 practically ruined it, together with the fact that the seals were practically annihilated. It revived temporarily in 1813 due to the discovery of the people of Stoughton of Palmer Island and the South Shetlands, but the trade was gone and the skins were now for the most part sent to the United States.

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"Captain John Magee and super-cargo Thomas H. Perkins. "Make the best of your way for Astoria, and on your arrival there you will dispose of such a part of the cargo as you think may be most for my interest. I think you had best sell a few casks of the most ordinary kinsang, if you can get one dollar a pound for it. If you find the price of sugar to be low you will then take into it as much of the best white

kind as will floor her, and fifty thousand weight of coffee if it is as low as we have heard,.....and fifteen thousand of salt-peter, if it is very low some nutmegs, and fifty thousand weight of pepper; this you will store in the fore peak for fear of injuring the teas. The sugars will save the expense of any stone-ballast, and it will make a floor for the teas, etc., at Canton. At Batavia you must, if possible, get as much freight for Canton as will pay half or more of your chargesYou must endeavor to be the first ship with Ginseng, for be assured you will do better alone than you will if there are three or four ships at Canton at the same time with you.----- Capt. Magee and Mr. Perkins are to have 5% commission for the sales of the present cargo, and $2\frac{1}{2}\%$ on the cargo home, and also 5% on the profit made on goods that may be purchased at Batavia and sold at Canton, or in any other similar case that may arise on the voyage. They are to have one-half the passage money, the other half belongs to the ship. The privilege of Captain Magee is 5% of what the ship carries on cargo, exclusive of adventures. The property of Mr. Perkins, it is understood, is to be on freight, which is to be paid for like other freighters. It is orders that the ships books shall be open to the inspection of the mates and doctor of the ship, so they may know the whole business "in case of the death of the captain or super-cargo.....You are not to pay any money to the crew while absent from home, unless in case of real necessity, and then they must allow an advance for the money...it is likewise

my order that in case of your sickness that you write a clause at the foot of these orders putting the command of the ship into the person's hands that you think the most equal to it, not having any regard to the station he at present has in the ship.....The sale of the Astrae is forbidden for this voyage, but if at Batavia or Canton you can agree to deliver her the next season for \$20,000 or \$25,000 you may do it..... You have leave to break them (the orders) in any part where you by calculation think it for my interest."

The Astrae arrived in Canton when there were fifteen other American vessels there and as a consequence her ginseng sold for \$20,000 less than prime cost and she was forced to pay \$27,800 in import duties.¹ As a consequence her trip was hardly successful.

The way in which business was transacted is well worth reading. As may have been recognized from the above quotation the captain and super-cargo were allowed a certain amount of free space in the vessel. This space was usually reserved to friends and business associates of the owners, who could upon payment of freight and commission, place small shipments in the hands of the super-cargo and give him the power to trade for them in Canton on the best terms he could obtain. This idea created interest in the voyage and stimulated trade; it helped to raise capital and even the poorest person could invest with only a small speculation.

The trade in Canton was most unusual.² There the

1. Spears--Story of American Merchant Marine. p. 112

2. Dulles--Old China Trade. p. 17-18

my understanding is that in case of some accident that you wish a clause at the foot of these orders making the payment of the ship into the vessel's hands that you wish the order to be not having any regard to the question of its payment, that is the ship.... The sale of the ship is forbidden for this voyage, but it is at liberty or liberty you can agree to deliver her the next season for \$20,000 or \$25,000 you may do it.... You have leave to break this (the order) in any part where you by collision claim it for my interest."

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The trade in Canton was most unusual.² There the

1. Spectra--Story of American Merchant Marine, p. 118
2. Dulles--Old China Trade, p. 14-15

hongs (factones or homes) contained a ground or street floor where the tea and silk was kept, while the upper stores were reserved for living quarters. Trade could only be conducted by the co-hong (body of Chinese merchants) who paid for the privilege of trading with foreigners. Thus, the captain or super-cargo would get a member of the co-hong to act as the security merchant of the ship--that is the member of the co-hong would agree to be responsible to the government of Canton not only for the ship and cargo, but also for the crew and their good behavior. In addition, there was a comprador, a man who handled and took care of the needs for ships supplies and the factones ashore. These men were honest and of high caliber for the co-hongs insisted upon it. Last but not least there were the linguists who used pidgin English. They acted as interpreters and supplied sampans to load and unload the ships. This, in brief is the way trade was transacted, but there were many limitations put on the social life of the factories; i.e., there could be no boating on the river, and no woman could walk in the gardens.

The Canton trade was very successful, but yet it had many difficult periods. The Embargo of 1807 was a very definite check on trade; as were the British with their impressments. For example in 1812 the British blockaded the port of Canton and as a result American shipping suffered greatly. With the advent of peace commerce revived. Dulles¹ gives a list of American vessels in Canton from 1815 to 1819. In the

1. Dulles--Old China Trade. p. 110

boats (junks or sampans) containing a group of about fifteen
men and the rest of the crew, while the other boats were
reserved for living quarters. Trade could only be conducted
by the co-hong (body of Chinese merchants) who paid for the
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list of American vessels in Canton from 1818 to 1840. In the

year 1815-1816 there were 30; 1816-1817, 38; 1817-1818, 39; and 1818-1819, 47. The total value of all American imports at Canton from June 6, 1816 to May 25, 1817 was estimated at \$5,609,600, while the exports were valued at \$5,703,000; American disbursements in port were estimated at \$250,000.¹ The Canton trade was highly developed for many years to follow and as sort of a comparison of present day conditions with those I have mentioned, let us consider how trade is now carried on. Silk shipments and tea but not so much are now sent in fast freighters from Japan and China to the Pacific ports; i.e., San Francisco and Vancouver, etc. Upon arrival the shipments are put on fast trains and sent to the Eastern markets. These trains are given right of way through the lines and usually make the trip in from 70 to 75 hours. Fast time is essential for when the demand is urgent, the goods must be on hand. The rates are exceedingly high, but a wait of a day or two to ship the silk by ship might mean a heavier loss due to the fluctuation of the demand and market price. Conditions have changed greatly and one must only marvel at the dangers and hardships which the Canton merchants of the olden days overcame with their skill, ingenuity, and foresight.

An off-shoot of the Northwest and Canton trade was that of South America. Trade with South America began early and was not bothered by our ocean war with France in 1798-1800 or by the War with England in 1812.² The high peak of the trade was not reached, however, until after 1815. Trade with most

1. Dulles--Old China Trade. p.111

2. Marvin--American Merchant Marine. p.205

year 1913-1914 there were 30; 1915-1916, 30; 1917-1918, 30; and 1919-1920, 30. The total value of all American imports at Canton from June 1, 1914 to May 31, 1917 was estimated at \$4,500,000, while the exports were valued at \$2,700,000. American businesses in Canton were estimated at \$250,000. The Canton trade was highly developed for many years to follow and as a result of a combination of present day conditions with those I have mentioned, it is considered that trade is now carried on. With shipping and sea not so much as now, and in fact shipping from Japan and China to the Pacific coast; i.e., San Francisco and Vancouver, etc. When the ships arrived and on the 1st of June and went to the wharves. These trains are given right of way through the lines and usually make the trip in from 70 to 75 hours. Fast time is essential for when the demand is urgent, the goods must be on hand. The rates are exceedingly high, but a mile of a day or two to ship the silk to ship which mean a heavier loss due to the fluctuation of the demand and market price. Conditions have changed greatly and one must only arrive at the danger and hardship which the Canton merchants of the other days ever came with their skill, industry, and foresight.

An offshoot of the Northwest and Canton trade was that of South America. Trade with South America began early and was not broken by the war with America in 1913-1914. The high peak of the trade was not reached, however, until after 1915. Trade with most

South American countries was prohibited but was carried on by smuggling. The priests and officials bought smuggled goods and were willing to exchange furs, skins, and copper for them. The American vessels usually carried specie; i.e., silver dollars and this was used as a medium of exchange for copper, etc. Firearms, tablecloths, and rum were staple commodities on all vessels. In return for such goods, Americans received copper from Chile which was exchanged for tea in Canton; whales teeth from the Galapagos Islands, sandalwood from Ingrahams Islands, fur seals from off the Chilean coast. Sugar was probably the most important import with rubber, hides, cocoa, and coffee coming in in large quantities. The South American trade was important but to us only as an out-growth of the Canton trade, for the period of its greatest height was reached after the period with which we are concerned.

There is one more trend of trade with which we are concerned; namely, that of the West Indies. This trade first came into being due to the fact that in the early days the West Indies were the first outlet for New England lumber, provisions, and dried fish and rum.¹ In return we imported molasses, chiefly, Jamaica rum, cocoa, sugar, tobacco. Once again several Yankee merchants soon developed triangular trade --namely, going to the West Indies, getting cargoes of rum, and trinkets, for their dried cod-fish and lumber, and then sailing to Africa where they exchanged their cargoes for human freight--namely, slaves, and returning to the West Indies

1. Morison--Maritime History of Massachusetts p.12

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where the slaves were exchanged for sugar and tobacco, and thence home. This trade, however, was not carried on to a great extent, for it proved a bit too repulsive to most of the Puritan merchants who usually shunned at nothing. It is true, however, that despite the trend of Puritanical thought, many Beacon Street fortunes were derived from the profits of this trade. Morison states that after 1788, due to laws passed forbidding the trade, the slave trade was only a minor item.¹ Trade with the West Indies was always protested by England, and especially after the War of 1812, as has been mentioned before in Chapter III. The trade was an important one, however, and despite the many restrictions, the handy New England merchants managed to carry it on, with the aid of the islanders themselves.

1. Morison, S. E.--Maritime History of Massachusetts p.19-32-34

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CHAPTER III

WAR OF 1812

AND ITS EFFECT ON MASSACHUSETTS COMMERCE

How did the people of New England and more especially the people of Massachusetts feel toward the war? On January 25, 1812, the Honorable Josiah Quincy, a Federalist and opposed to war, speaking in the House of Representatives of the United States, said, "It is the incumbent duty of every nation to protect its essential interests, thus it is the most impressive and critical duty of a nation, composed of a voluntary association of vast, powerful, and independent states, to protect the essential interests of all its great component parts.¹ Quincy states further that "Every local circle of states, as well as of individuals, has a set of interests, in the prosperity of which, the happiness of the section to which they belong is identified."² To further strengthen and develop his plea for protection of commerce, Quincy quotes figures in which he states the relative proportion of the commercial interests to population. He endeavors to show that in the country North of the Hudson, although its population is approximately two and one-half million and its commercial interests predominate, agriculture and manufacture have grown up in more intimate relation to commerce. He means, in other words, that industry there has its shape and energy from commercial prosperity----"manufacture have a direct or indirect reference to the construction, supply and support of naviga-

1. Speech of the Honorable Josiah Quincy in the House of Representatives of the U. S. January 25, 1812. (Boston Public Library. 4318.40) In Relation to Maritime Protection 18pp. p.2
2. ibid. p.3

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tion 1890. p.2

2. Ibid. p.3

tion....while agriculture in a country divided into small farms, among a population great--compared with its extent--requires quick circulation and easy processes, in the exchange of its commodities, and this can be obtained only by an active and prosperous commerce."¹ To quote again from Quincy, "I state that it appears by the above abstract that the single state of Massachusetts alone possesses nearly half a million of tonnage--in round numbers 496,000 tons, equal within 50,000 tons, to the whole tonnage owned by all states South of the Hudson." The abstract to which Quincy refers shows the aggregate tonnage of the United States, which he estimates at 1,424,000, with 221,000 owned between the Mississippi and Potomac and 321,000 between the Potomac and Hudson. He estimates the tonnage North of the Hudson as 882,000 which gives the single state of Massachusetts practically a little over half.²

We can discuss now the attitude of the State of Massachusetts itself, bearing in mind at all times that manufacture and agriculture bear an intimate relationship to commerce. In the Spring of 1812, Massachusetts was represented in the Senate by James Lloyd, a moderate Federalist, and Joseph B. Varnum, a Republican and supporter of the war. In 1810, Massachusetts elected 17 members to the House, 9 Federalists, and 8 Republicans, while in 1812, out of 20 members elected, 17 were Federalists.³ This increasing apportionment of Federalists is an indication of the attitude of the State toward the war. The election of the Federalists showed that

1. Quincy, In Relation to Maritime Protection p.4

2. *ibid.* p.4

3. Allen, Gardner W. Massachusetts in War of 1812. Commonwealth History of Massachusetts vol. 3 p.474

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war was not favored because the Federalists advocated secession if war was declared, and as Governor Sullivan had declared earlier in a letter to Jefferson, the reports in the State were that the British government send armed forces to take possession of the state and make it once again a dependent of England.¹

The Federalists carried all elections in the state during the war by large majorities; and Caleb Strong, an extreme Federalist was governor throughout the period.² The attitudes of the Governor and both houses of the Legislature during this period are interesting. The State Senate declared during one of its sittings that "Beyond that submission which laws enacted agreeably to the Constitution make necessary, and that self-defence which the obligation to repel hostile invasion justifies, a people can give no encouragement to a war of such a character without becoming partakers in its guilt, and rendering themselves obnoxious to those just retributions of Divine Vengeance by which, sooner or later the authors and abettors of such a war will be assuredly overtaken."³ A committee of the legislature reported, "Whenever the national compact is violated and the citizens of this State are oppressed by cruel and unauthorized laws, the legislature is bound to interpose its power and wrest from the oppressor his victim."⁴ Josiah Quincy who was now in the State Senate of Massachusetts, on June 15, 1813, offered the following measure to that august body "Resolved, as the sense of the Senate of

1. Sears. Jefferson and the Embargo. p.68-69
2. Allen. Massachusetts in War of 1812. p.475
3. ibid. p.475
4. ibid. p.476

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abettors of such a war will be assuredly overthrown." A

committee of the Legislature reported, "Wherever the national
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Massachusetts, on June 15, 1813, offered the following message
to that august body "Resolved, as the sense of the Senate of

Massachusetts that in a war like the present, waged without justifiable cause and prosecuted in a manner which indicates that conquest and ambition are its real motives, it is not becoming a moral and religious people to express any approbation of military or naval exploits which are not immediately connected with defence of our sea-coast and soil."¹ Not only did the legislature of the state condemn the war, but even town-meetings expressed their disapproval. For example, the town of Newbury in a town meeting adopted this memorial: "We remember the resistance of our fathers to oppressions which dwindled into insignificance when compared with those which we are called on to endure. The rights which we have received from God we will never yield to man. We call on our State Legislature to protect us in the enjoyment of those privileges to assert which our fathers died, and to defend which we profess ourselves ready to resist unto blood."²

The quotations which I have mentioned give one the impression that the war found little favor in Massachusetts. Such, of course, to be perfectly frank, is true; and yet when one studies the figures of volunteers and men in war regiments one finds that the State of Massachusetts was well represented. One has to keep in mind at all times, though, that enlistments were made for the most part for short terms and consequently, it is fairly difficult to get an accurate estimate of the men enlisted from Massachusetts at any one time. Bradford states that the whole number of militia called out in Massachusetts

1. Hart, Commonwealth History of Massachusetts vol.3 p.475
2. ibid. p.475-476

Massachusetts that in a war time and emergency, when all other
 justifiable cause and pretext is a manner which indicates
 that complaint and rebellion are its true motives, it is not
 becoming a moral and religious people to express any sympathy
 with it, or to ally on moral grounds which are not immediately
 connected with defense of our sea-coast and soil. 11
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 town of Boston in a town meeting adopted this resolution: "We
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 justified into independence when connected with those which
 we are called on to support. The rights which we have received
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 Legislature to protect us in the enjoyment of those privileges
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during the war was estimated at 45,000 and that the greater portion of this number enlisted during the months of July, August, September, and October, 1814.¹ Hart mentions the large number to enlist in the regular army, but gives no definite figures. The ninth Infantry of the First Brigade from Massachusetts performed with gallantry at the Battle of Chipeiva, July 5, 1814. The twenty-first regiment of the Second Brigade was recruited in Massachusetts, as were the thirty-third and thirty-fourth regiments of regulars.² As Hart goes on to show, the population of Massachusetts and Virginia did not differ greatly, yet Massachusetts contributed four times as much money to support the war and many more men. On the other hand, Harlow³ states that the Middle States purchased \$35,000,000 worth of bonds as opposed to \$3,000,000 worth in New England during the entire duration of the war. In 1814, six regiments--the ninth, twenty-first, thirty-third, thirty-fourth, fortieth, and forty-fifth were recruited in Massachusetts for the regular army, and only three regiments were recruited in Virginia. We must not forget too, that the manpower of the navy and of privateers was drawn, for the most part, from Massachusetts and New England. Bradford, in his History of Massachusetts, estimates that the expense occurred by the Commonwealth amounted to \$800,000.

One may well ask--how do you explain the actions of the State Legislature and of the various town meetings and yet have a large militia, enlistments in the regular army, and a

1. Bradford, Alden. History of Massachusetts. 3 volumes Boston 1829 vol.3 p.230
2. Hart. p.486
3. Harlow, Ralph Volney. Growth of the United States. New York 1932 Revised. 72 chapters. 872 pp. p.294

During the war was estimated at \$5,000 and that the number

of this number as listed during the months of July,

August, September, and October, 1864. These numbers are

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distinction between the regular army and the militia from

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Gettysburg, July 3, 1863. The Twenty-first Regiment of the

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On the other hand, Kentucky stated that the Middle States

contributed \$25,000,000 worth of goods as opposed to \$5,000,000

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One may well ask how do you explain the action of

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1. Bradford, History of Massachusetts, 3 volumes
Boston 1853 vol. 3, p. 233

2. Ibid. p. 450

3. Ibid. History of the United States, New
York 1852 vol. 2, p. 234

good donation of money. The best answer is that the State of Massachusetts was ruled by a very small minority of reactionaries who preferred to maintain their commerce and trade by the acceptance of insults from England. And yet one cannot be entirely satisfied with that answer--for we must admit that the government in Washington was at fault too. To explain this latter statement, let us remember Jefferson and his Embargo which has been mentioned before. The Embargo with all its restrictions on American ships and shipping was greatly felt in Massachusetts which in 1807 owned more than one-third of the registered tonnage engaged in the carrying trade.¹ The Embargo, although it was broken, was injurious to commerce, and as Hart says, produced stagnation and bankruptcy in the coast towns--i.e. ports like Salem, Beverly, and Newburyport suffered materially and never fully recovered from this interruption to their prosperity. The Embargo likewise aided manufacturing, and as a result, old industries expanded and new ones developed. The Federalists at the time were chiefly interested in shipping, and since they were the aristocrats of the time and owned or controlled most of the money and means for doing business, they were hardest hit. Consequently, when Jefferson repealed the Embargo, he did so with full knowledge that he had revived the almost defunct Federalist party, transforming it into a political organization, which was to be until 1815 anti-federal and anti-national.² The extreme group which controlled the State of Massachusetts hoped to establish

1. Sears, J. M. Jefferson and the Embargo. p.145

2. Hart, A. B. Commonwealth History of Massachusetts. p.433

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 until 1815 anti-Federal and anti-national.² The extreme group
 which controlled the State of Massachusetts hoped to establish

a New England Confederation, and in the Hartford Convention of 1814 the only reason that prevented a secession was the fact that the Federalists, who comprised the peace party and represented about one-half of the people, were split among themselves. The more radical of their leaders were held at bay because the moderate Federalists threatened to leave the party if any act of treason was committed. Hart states that as a consequence that State was controlled by a minority of about one-fourth of the people. We must remember too that the merchant interests as championed by the Federalists were bitterly opposed by the people of the hinterlands--namely, farmers, etc., and as a consequence the extreme Federalists were opposed by powerful interests. Also one wonders if those Federalists who had invested their fortunes derived from commerce in manufacture did not oppose extreme Federalists because of impetus which war would give to manufacturers.

This extreme minority refused to take up arms unless New England was actually invaded, and they likewise refused to go out of their own territory to fight. As an example of their reasoning let us see what took place when the Secretary of War issued his call for 25,000 men from New England--based on the theory that Congress had the right to ask for militia for national defense because it had the power to declare war. Chief Justice Parsons of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts told Governor Strong that the right to decide when the constitutional exigency had arisen which should call the State

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Militia into National service rested with him, rather than with Congress or the President.¹ Governor Strong declared that neither foreign invasion nor domestic insurrection existed and that therefore he must decline the President's request for the State's quota of militia for the defence of the coast. In retaliation the national government, since it could not enforce its request, withdrew the garrisons from the New England forts, leaving those States to defend themselves and refused to send them their quota of the arms which were distributed among the States. When late in the war due to the danger of British invasion Governor Strong did call out the militia for the defence of the coast and Maine--which he previously had refused to do, he was careful to make it appear evident that these troops were not in the National service.² Thus, he had their own commanding officer appointed--a state officer, thus a state army. When Massachusetts sought reimbursement for the use of these troops, the National government most emphatically denied it.

There are two more things which concern the State of Massachusetts in the war--namely, trading with the enemy, and the rise of the privateers. We know that the people of Massachusetts were not satisfied with the war. They objected to it because it hindered the revival of commerce and trade. We must remember that previous to the war, the various decrees and embargoes were practically discarded. As a consequence, the trade which had been handicapped now began to develop some

1. Hart. Commonwealth History of Massachusetts p.477
2. Hart. Commonwealth History of Massachusetts p.477

Millin into national service raised after his death was
the Congress of the President. Governor Nelson declared
that neither Federal nor State's jurisdiction existed
and that therefore he was declining the President's request for
the State's power of militia for the defense of the coast. In
rejection of the national government, since it could not enforce
its request, although the militia from the New England forces,
leaving those States to defend themselves and refused to send
their militia to the aid of the State of British in-
vasion because they did not see the militia for the defense
of the coast and Maine--which he previously had refused to do.
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these troops, the national government most graciously denied
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There are two more things which concern the State of
Massachusetts in the war--namely, standing with the army, and
the rise of the privateer. As most of the people of
Massachusetts were not satisfied with the war. They objected
to it because it hindered the revival of commerce and industry.
The great business cost previous to the war, the various industries
and enterprises were practically abandoned. As a consequence,
the trade which had been languished now began to develop again.

of its former proportion. So when war was declared, the people who were carrying on trade with the enemy continued to do so. This trade was fostered by the British government. The British government was forced to issue licenses to carry on trade because the war with France was still being waged in Portugal and Spain, and the British army was dependent on the American merchantmen for its food supplies. The licenses which were issued by the British Admiralty allowed the vessels to pass through the blockades and rendered them free from capture on the high seas. These licenses were issued and openly bought and sold in the large ports--i.e. Boston, New York, and Philadelphia.¹ Trade with the British Colonial possessions was carried on in the same manner--that is, the Colonial governors issued licenses which permitted trade in the West Indies, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia; and Hart states that the British army in Canada lived on flour and beef which was purchased in Upper New England and New York. In fact, every seaboard state traded with the enemy, and this trade developed into such an evil that in December, 1813, Madison had passed an Embargo which was repealed in April, 1814.² This Embargo forbade all vessels to leave ports of the United States, with the sole exception of foreign ships which could leave with necessary sea stores and whatever goods they had on board. The Embargo further stated that the Collectors of the Ports could search any ship, or seize any product or freight which they believed was intended for exportation. Channing and Hart both

1. Hart, Commonwealth History of Massachusetts. p.497

2. Channing, Edward, A History of the United States. New York 1927. vol.IV p.537

of its foreign possession. As when it was declared, the people who were at work on trade with the enemy continued to do so. This trade was tolerated by the British Government. The British Government was forced to issue licenses to carry on trade because the war with France was still being waged in Portugal and Spain, and the British army was dependent on the American government for food supplies. The licenses which were issued by the British Admiralty allowed the vessels to pass through the blockade and rendered them free from capture on the high seas. These licenses were issued and open to houses and sold in the large ports--i.e. Boston, New York, and Philadelphia. Trade with the British Colonial possessions was carried on in the same manner--that is, the Colonial governments issued licenses which permitted trade in the West Indies, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and Barbados; and the British army in Canada lived on flour and meat which was carried in Upper New England and New York. In fact, every seaboard state traded with the enemy, and this trade developed into such an evil that in December, 1813, Madison had passed an embargo which was repealed in April, 1814. This embargo forbade all vessels to leave ports of the United States, with the sole exception of foreign ships which could leave with necessary sea stores and necessary goods they had on board. The embargo further stated that the Collectors of the Ports could search any ship, or seize any produce on board which they believed was intended for exportation. Chesapeake and Barbados

state that the Embargo, instead of preventing trade, merely made it more expensive and land transportation was now at a premium. In fact, the demand so far exceeded the supply that prices immediately rose and remained high until peace was declared. Channing gives an example of the rise and fall in prices in Boston during this period.¹

Rise and Fall of Prices in Boston 1812-1815

	Flour (bbl.)	Beef (lb.)	Coffee (lb.)	Molasses (gal.)	Fuel Coal (ton)	Tobacco (lb.)
1812	\$11	.07-.10	.15-.16	.52-\$.75	\$14	.06
1813	\$13-\$17	.07-.10	.20-.30	.75- 1.47	\$14	.09-.13
1814	\$14-\$15	.07-.10	.24-.37	.85- 1.08	\$27	.06½-.13
1815	\$9.25-\$7.50	.07-.13	.24-.27	.70- 1.60	\$20	.07

As we may well note prices were high in 1814 due to the Embargo and the bulky goods rose higher than others, due probably to the cost of transportation. I think it is interesting to note that the price of beef was practically constant and wonder if the answer is not to be found in the fact that the source of supply was probably to a large extent local. Bradford states² that the winter of 1814 in Massachusetts was one of great anxiety and embarrassment. There was no immediate danger from the enemy, but the long suspension of navigation and commerce had impoverished the people, and a war of nearly three years had subjected many to privations and sufferings. The results of the repeal of the Embargo and the signing of peace in 1815 will be discussed later when we view the effects of the war itself on commerce.

One of the memorable highlights of the War of 1812

1. Channing. History of U. S. Vol. IV p. 538
2. Bradford, Alden, History of Massachusetts Vol. III 326 pp. Boston 1829 Vol III p. 222

state that the embargo, instead of increasing trade, merely made it more expensive and less convenient, and now as a result. In fact, the demand for tea exceeded the supply and prices immediately rose and remained high until peace was declared. Channing gives an example of the rise and fall in prices in Boston during this period.

Rise and Fall of Prices in Boston 1812-1815

From (1812)	To (1813)	From (1813)	To (1814)	From (1814)	To (1815)
1812 11	07-10	1813 10	08-10	1814 10	07-10
1813 11	07-10	1814 10	08-10	1815 10	07-10
1814 11	07-10	1815 10	08-10		
1815 11	07-10				

As we may well note prices were high in 1812 due to the embargo and the price rose higher than others, due mostly to the cost of transportation. I think it is interesting to note that the price of coal was practically constant and harder if the answer is not to be found in the fact that the source of supply was probably so large extent local. Bradford states that the winter of 1814 in Massachusetts was one of great anxiety and embarrassment. There was no immediate danger from the enemy, but the long suspension of navigation and commerce had impoverished the people, and a war of nearly three years had subjected many to privations and afflictions. The results of the repeal of the embargo and the signing of peace in 1815 will be discussed later when we view the attitude of the war itself as commerce.

One of the memorable highlights of the war of 1812

and one of the whole redeeming features of the war from an American viewpoint is the rise of the privateers. Unfortunately although the Federal Government was strong for privateers, the strict Federalists in New England were not, and as a consequence it is very difficult to get a real view of the situation. I say strict Federalists did not favor privateers, and once again the answer is found in the fact that they felt that such activity hindered their commerce. On the other hand though here was a chance for the sailors and merchants to put their ships to work. An added inducement was of course the high reward which you received if you were successful in capturing many vessels and the risk involved only aided in whetting the appetite of the devil may care Yankee sailors. It has been said that the trade which Massachusetts and New England carried on with the enemy during the war of 1812 was a safety valve which prevented actual secession from the Union. I believe that is true, and yet I think that the astonishing rise and growth of the privateers is still another factor in keeping the New England states in the National fold.

There is no definite estimate of the number of privateers which were in action during the war. Different writers disagree--Hart gives the following figures¹ which are taken from two sources--namely, George Emmons in a History of the United States Navy gives the number of 529 privateers in the War of 1812, of which 129 were from Massachusetts; Captain Coggeshall, himself, a privateer states that only 250 ships

1. Hart, Common History of Massachusetts p. 494

and one of the chief reasons for the fact that the
American viewpoint is the rise of the individual. But
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were not averse to the policy and sometimes to their
ships at sea. An added argument was of course the high
reward which was promised if you were successful in capturing
any vessels and the risk involved only tended to make the
speculation of the fleet very profitable indeed. It has been
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returned on this the same during the war of 1812 was a safety
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not think it true, and yet I think that the economic rise
and growth of the privateers is still another factor in keeping
the New England states in the National fold.

There is no definite estimate of the number of
privateers which were active during the war. Different
authors disagree--but give the following figures: which are
taken from the sources--namely, George Brown in a History of
the United States Navy gives the number of 333 privateers in
the war of 1812, of which 120 were from Massachusetts; Captain
Conrad, himself, a privateer master, says only 250 ships

from the whole country were engaged as privateers during the war, and of these 87 were from Massachusetts. Estimating from the above figures, I believe it is safe to say that the percentage of privateers in the War from Massachusetts was between one-fourth and one-third of the total number. Such a percentage obviously shows that the good merchants of the Bay State did their part. The greatest number of privateers in Massachusetts was furnished by two ports; namely, Boston and Salem, and of the two, Salem had a slight edge. The privateers all over the country took in a total number of prizes estimated between 1300 and 1600. We can get a better view of the situation by a brief discussion of some of the exploits of privateers from Salem. One of the most famous was the ship "Grand Turk," which, transposed from a merchantmen to a privateer, captured three ships, twelve brigs, seven schooners, and eight sloops of the enemy.¹ The most famous privateer was the ship "America" owned by the famous Crowinshield family. She carried twenty guns and one hundred and fifty seamen. The number of prizes which she captured were twenty-six valued at \$1,100,000 and she likewise destroyed a greater amount at sea.² The Common History of Massachusetts edited by Hart conflicts with Marvin for it states that twenty-seven vessels were captured and brought safely to port, while eight were destroyed and seven were recaptured. It does agree at estimating the total value of the profits at \$1,100,000--of which more than half a million was taken by the officers and crew as their shares.

1. Marvin, W. L., The American Merchant Marine. New York 1902 436 pp. 18 chaps. p.214
2. Ibid., p.214

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 country took in a total number of officers estimated between
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 Salem. One of the most famous was the ship "Grand Turk,"
 which, transferred from a merchantman to a privateer, captured
 three ships, twelve prizes, seven schooners, and eight others
 of the coast. The most famous privateer was the ship
 "Hector," owned by the famous Gloucester family. She carried
 twenty guns and one hundred and fifty seamen. The number of
 prizes which she captured were twenty-six valued at \$1,100,000
 and she likewise destroyed a greater amount of sea. The
 General History of Massachusetts edited by H. F. Condit with
 mention the 11 vessels that twenty-seven vessels were captured
 and burned, partly by force, while others were destroyed and
 seven were recaptured. It does not at all indicate the total
 value of the prizes at \$1,100,000--of which more than half a
 million was taken by the officers and crew in their shares.

Such is a mention in brief of some privateers, others were not as successful--indeed many privateers were captured, and since more men wanted to join the armed privateers than the navy--the matter of recruiting a good navy was rendered difficult. The importance of the privateers cannot be denied, and Marvin states that it was "the extraordinary vigor and aggressiveness of the merchant marine and shipping transformed into privateers which saved America and let her commissioners make an honorable peace, instead of a humiliating one if land struggle was to be considered."

1. The Pamphlet Magazine, Pamphlet Publishing Co.,
Washington, D. C., January 6, 1934. Vol. 201, No. 1, p. 1.
2. Murray, Andrew D. American Merchant Marine. p. 170.

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an honorable peace, instead of a humiliating one if land
struggle was to be considered."

CHAPTER IV

PEACE--EFFECTS ON COMMERCE, RECIPROCITY ON SEA RISE OF MANUFACTURES, TARIFF OF 1816

After every war business seems to undergo a period of false recovery which is in turn followed by a fall in prices or better still, a depression. The War of 1812 was no exception to the rule--prices before the war had reached an average of about 90-95 for the years 1810-1812. They continued to go up during the war until they reached the excessively high peak of approximately 125 and then with the advent of peace they reached an average of about 100 in 1817-1818, and with the panic of 1819 they dropped and dropped to about an average of 70 in 1820.¹ The chief reason for this decline is probably to be found in the loss of the foreign markets. Europe was quick to revive her own carrying trade; i.e., shipping interests, and England was not at all adverse to keeping her ports closed to American shipping. The period between 1816 and 1830 is described as one of Reciprocity on the Sea.² That is, United States and England signed a reciprocity treaty which stated that no discriminating duties on ships or products in the trade between this country and the United Kingdom could be imposed. At first glance one is inclined to believe that the United States would benefit thereby for her commerce would now be able to carry on direct trade with all British possessions. Such was not the case, for the British wisely insisted that they would continue to control

1. The Pathfinder Magazine. Pathfinder Publishing Company Washington, D. C., January 6, 1934. No. 2088 Pp.1 and 8
2. Marvin, Winthrop L. American Merchant Marine. p. 173

CHAPTER IV

THE EFFECTS OF THE AMERICAN PROHIBITION OF THE TRADE IN SALT

After every war business seems to undergo a period of false recovery which is in turn followed by a fall in prices or better still, a depression. The war of 1812 was no exception to this rule--prices before the war had reached an average of about 90-95 for the years 1810-1812. They continued to go up during the war until they reached the exorbitantly high peak of approximately 125 and even with the advent of peace they reached an average of about 100 in 1815-1816, and with the peace of 1815 they dropped and dropped to about an average of 70 in 1820.¹ The chief reason for this decline is probably to be found in the loss of the foreign markets. Europe was quick to revive her own carrying trade; i.e., shipping interests, and England was not at all adverse to keeping her ports closed to American shipping. The period between 1816 and 1820 is described as one of reciprocity on the sea. That is, United States and England signed a reciprocity treaty which stated that no discriminating duties on ships or products in the trade between this country and the United Kingdom could be imposed. At first glance one is inclined to believe that the United States would benefit thereby for her commerce would now be able to carry on direct trade with all British possessions. Such was not the case, for she British wisely insisted that they would continue to control

1. The Patterson Magazine, Patterson Publishing Company, Washington, D. C., January 8, 1934, No. 208, pp. 1 and 2.
2. Marvin, Arthur L. American Maritime History, p. 173.

and regulate the trade of Canada and the West Indies as they so desired and likewise they stated that American ships should engage only in direct trade with the British East Indies. Since these provisions were not apparently harsh enough, it was provided that American flour, vegetables, lumber, fish, and cattle could be carried to the West Indies in vessels owned by British subjects.¹ As a consequence, an American fleet of approximately 80,000 tons was laid up in idleness, plus the added fact that since American ports had now been opened to British shipping they soon flooded the American market with huge quantities of manufactured goods such as woolens, cottons, chinaware, and hardware. The British also developed a triangular trade which McMaster² describes as follows: "The profits of this triangular voyage enabled her (A British vessel) to bring British goods, wares, and merchandise from England to the United States for much less than the actual cost of transportation on an American vessel, which could not make a similar voyage. An English merchant carrier could even afford to bring goods from Liverpool to New York at an actual loss, inasmuch as she could easily recover on the voyages from New York to the West Indies, and from the West Indies back to Liverpool, on neither of which American shipping could affect him. In the hope of doing to American shipping what false invoices and auction sales had already done to American importers, manufacturers, and retailers, the direct trade between England and America was carried on by Englishmen so much below

1. Marvin, Winthrop L., American Merchant Marine p.176
2. McMaster, John Bach, History of American People 6 vols. New York 1895 Vol. IV p.348

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the cost of the voyage that during the summer of 1816, beef and tallow, butter, hams, and potatoes were actually brought from Galway and Newny to New York where they undersold our home products. Indeed companies were formed to continue their importation. Thus, the one trade which by the convention seemed on the basis of equality, was in reality conducted in a way wholly favorable to England." The triangular trade in more explicit words consisted of an English ship--say in Boston loading with lumber, flour, or provisions, and sailing to the West Indies from which United States ships were prohibited. There the English ship would take on a cargo of sugar, rum, or molasses and either go direct to England or back to Boston where she would dispose of her cargo and take on a cargo of cotton or woolens for her home country--England. The people in the United States missed the imports of silks, muslins, brocades, edged tools, etc., from Europe--likewise they missed Madeira, coffee, and tea¹ and the demand which arose for them with the cessation of hostilities aided the British tremendously. As McMaster points out, the demand was so great that importers were discarded and sailors and supercargoes were auctioning off their cargoes to the highest bidders in the city streets and as a result fabulous profits were made. The British extended credit on terms over \$500 to 30, 60, and 90 days, and in some cases more with the resultant effect that importers brought too many goods, could not pay for them, and in most cases after the hysteria had died down, they

1. McMaster, History of American People p.322 Vol. IV

The cost of the voyage that during the summer of 1812, beef and mutton, butter, sugar, and potatoes were received from the United States and a way to New York where they could be sold for home products. Indeed necessities were found to be in such short supply that the trade which by the convention seemed on the basis of equality, was in reality conducted in a way wholly favorable to England. The principal cargo in some explicit goods consisted of an English ship--any in Boston loaded with sugar, flour, or provisions, and sailing to the West Indies from which United States ships were prohibited. There the English ship would take on a cargo of sugar, rum, or molasses and either go direct to England or back to Boston where she would dispose of her cargo and take on a cargo of cotton or woolens for her home country--England. The people in the United States missed the reports of slaves, sugar, molasses, edged tools, etc., from Europe--likewise they missed Madeira, coffee, and tea, and the demand which arose for them with the cessation of competition aided the English tremendously. As McMaster points out, the demand was so great that imports were discarded and sailors and seamen were auctioning off their cargoes to the highest bidder in the city streets and as a result fabulous profits were made. The British extended credit on terms as low as 30, 40, and 50 days, and in some cases more with the result that English reports brought for many goods, would not pay for them, and in most cases when the payment was due they

could not sell them.

Such conditions obviously couldn't be tolerated, and the demands on Congress to do something finally resulted in the passage of a general Act, the provisions of which, simply stated, were the offer to withdraw all discriminating duties in favor of any foreign nation which did the same thing--the President was left as the judge to decide that the foreign nation had withdrawn all discriminating or counter-manding duties which were to the disadvantage of the United States.¹ Only three countries accepted this offer of reciprocity in the direct trade--namely, Great Britain, Sweden, and Algiers.² As a consequence little effect, if any, resulted in the general trend of trade. The Maritime provinces; i.e., Nova Scotia, etc., however, passed an act which was to bring down the wrath of Congress upon all foreign countries. This act was the Plaster of Paris Act, which placed an export duty of twenty shillings a ton on plaster, a large article of export, if the plaster was exported in an American ship. This was the last straw, and Congress now forbade any foreign ship to bring plaster into the United States from any port from which American vessels were excluded.³ Congress was now up in arms entirely, and as a consequence, another retaliatory measure was passed; namely, forbidding admission to all British ships from British ports wherein American vessels were prohibited. This blow was of course intended primarily to hit the West Indies, and now a vigorous commercial war was begun between

1. Hunt's Merchant Magazine. Freeman Hunt, Editor, Vol. II

2. Marvin, American Merchant Marine. p.179

3. Ibid., p.177

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1. Hunt's Merchant Magazine. Freeman Hunt, Editor, Vol. II
2. Murray, American Merchant Marine. p. 179
3. Ibid., p. 177

England and the United States. Such a war was bound to be injurious, and McMaster says¹ "Half the tonnage owned along the sea-board and engaged in the coasting and foreign trade was said to have been laid up. In every sea-port ships could be seen dismantled and literally rotting at the wharves, while American sailors sought occupation abroad, and American shipwrights went off to New Brunswick to cut timber and build vessels to carry it to Europe or to the Indies. Once more all branches of trade connected with ship-building languished, and thousands of Mechanics were thrown out of employment." Trade between the West Indies and the United States was essential, and so smuggling was very common, and the authorities completely disregarded it in order to allow needed articles to be brought into the country. Smuggling gave the people cheaper and more abundant necessities of life. Marvin² cites as an example of the indifference of the customs officials the example of the Connecticut Senator who sent out a quantity of candles, which were on the forbidden list, but the people of the Colony were in need of the candles, so a clever customs official classified them as herrings and they passed through.

Congress finally in a conciliatory mood in March, 1817, passed a law which forbade the importation of goods from any foreign port, except in American vessels, or vessels of the country from which the goods came. An important proviso excepted from this Act the vessels of countries that imposed no such prohibition against American shipping. Another pro-

1. McMaster, History of American People. Vol. IV. p.349
2. Marvin, W. L., American Merchant Marine p.178

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viso absolutely closed the coasting trade of the United States to foreign vessels, but in reality these foreign ships had all along been barred out in effect by heavy tonnage duties.¹ Hunt gives full details of this Navigation Act of 1817.² It established that after the 30th day of September, 1817, no vessels or boats engaged in the fisheries should be entitled to the bounties allowed by law, unless the officers and at least three-fourths of the crew were citizens of the United States or persons not the subjects of any foreign province or state. Also, every vessel employed in the coasting trade, except those going from one state to another adjoining on sea-coast or navigable river, or from Long Island to the state of New York to Rhode Island and vice versa should be subject to a duty of 50 cents per ton, unless three-fourths of the crew at least were American citizens and not subject to any foreign province. It was also decided that after that time a duty of 50 cents was to be paid upon every American vessel entering from a foreign port--unless the officers and at least two-thirds of the crew should be of the same national character during the voyage, with the exception of sickness and desertion.

In 1818 under the provisions of the Navigation Act of 1817 the discriminating duties against the Netherlands, Prussia, Hamburg, and Bremen were discontinued, and one by one treaties of reciprocity have been signed until today we have treaties of reciprocity with practically every country of the world.

1. Meloney, Heritage of Tyre. p.38

2. Hunt's Merchant Magazine. Vol. V. 1841. p.46

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The various Navigation Acts and Reciprocity agreements are of importance to us, because they tend to show us why the interest of the people in Massachusetts at this time was turning from shipping and commercial interests to other fields. As has been stated before, the War of 1812 resulted in bringing about distressing economic and industrial conditions. Capital and labor had been forced to find new fields of employment and the people of Massachusetts were no exceptions to the rule. As a result, a brisk rise of manufacturing begun, and this soon reached such a high level that by 1840 it dominated the State. The rise of manufacturing was of course brought about because during the war the people were forced to provide their own necessities of life--for it was practically impossible to buy any English manufactured goods.

Edward Everett Hale writes that¹ "Homespun industries" existed in New England and Massachusetts at all times. As he points out, the Yankee ingenuity of the inhabitants prohibited their calmly accepting as inevitable the decline of shipping and commerce. If shipping and commerce were to fail, all well and good, there were other outlets for their energy, and they would produce their own necessities. Coupled with this Yankee ingenuity and determination was the added feature of favorable physical conditions. If in the early days the forests and streams had made a turn to ship-building and shipping inevitable, then now when power was needed for the newly developed cotton and woolen mills, the unbridled power of the Merrimac

1. Hale, Edward Everett--The Story of Massachusetts. Boston. D. Lothrop Company. 22 chapters 354 pages; p.341

The various Navigation Acts and Restrictive agreements are of importance to us, because they tend to show us why the interest of the people in Massachusetts at this time was centered upon shipping and commercial interests to a great extent. As has been stated before, the war of 1812 resulted in a virtual stoppage of economic and industrial conditions. Capital and labor had been forced to find new fields of employment and the people of Massachusetts were no exception to the rule. As a result, a brisk rise of manufacturing began, and this soon reached such a high level that by 1840 it dominated the State. The rise of manufacturing was of course brought about because during the war the people were forced to provide their own necessities of life--for it was practically impossible to buy any English manufactured goods.

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and of the other rivers and streams provided the means by which the ability to do was carried on. Thus, when previously the Essex fisherman¹ had devoted his spare time to making boots and shoes in the winter season when it was impossible for him to be at sea, now he devoted full time to his project. Today the boot and shoe industry is the largest one in the State, I believe. It, of course, was a boon to those small towns which were not conveniently situated on rivers, for it doesn't require as much power as do the machines of the mills. In the early beginnings, too, it was all done by manual labor, the same as practically every housewife in Massachusetts made the clothes which her family wore.

I have stated that manufacturing reached a real boom during the War. This is true, but before the war, the various embargoes and decrees had aided it. We must not reach the conclusion that manufacturing began at this time. Such is not the case, for in Massachusetts and New England manufacturing began practically as soon as the colonies were founded. That is to be expected--if the barren fields and unstable crops made a turn to the sea inevitable--they likewise made a turn to manufacturing inevitable. This was necessary because in order to trade with the mother country the colonies needed staple products and commodities, and since the land was unable to produce them, the colonists had of necessity to make them for themselves. Pitkin gives a fairly good review of the rise of manufactures and of the attitude of England toward such a

1. Hale, Edward Everett--The Story of Massachusetts. Boston D. Lothrop Company. 22 chapters. 354 pages; page 345

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rise. As early as 1719 the House of Commons declared "that the erecting manufactories in the Colonies tended to lessen their dependence on Great Britain."¹ In 1731 the House of Commons directed the Board of Trade to inquire and report "with respect to laws made, manufactures set up, or trade carried on detrimental to the trade, navigation, or manufactures of Great Britain."² The result of this investigation was a report which stated that in the colonies north of Virginia and more especially New England, there were more trades carried on and factories established than in any of the other of the British colonies. The Board stated that as a consequence, it would be well for Great Britain to direct these trades in such a manner as to produce all kinds of naval stores and products which would be of material use to the mother country. As an example of the types of manufactures carried on in Massachusetts Bay, we have these quotations from Pitkin. In Massachusetts Bay, in 1731, "an act was made to encourage the manufacture of paper, which law interferes with the profit made by the British merchant, on foreign paper sent thither."³ To quote again from Pitkin, "The Governor of Massachusetts Bay informed us that in some parts of this province, the inhabitants worked up their wool and flax into an ordinary coarse cloth for their own use, but did not export any. That the greatest part of the woolen and linen clothing worn in this province was imported from Great Britain, and sometimes from Ireland; but considering the excessive price of labor in New England, the merchant

1. Pitkin, Timothy A Statistical View of the Commerce of the United States of America. New Haven 1835 13 chps. 596pp. p.461

2. *ibid.* p.462

3. *ibid.* p.462

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1. Pickin, Timothy. A Statistical View of the Commerce of the United States of America. New Haven 1835. 13 chaps. 596pp. p.481
2. Ibid. p.482
3. Ibid. p.482

could afford what was imported cheaper than what was made in the country. There were also a few hat-makers in the maritime towns, and the greater part of the leather used in that country was manufactured among themselves. That there had been for many years some iron works in that province which had afforded the people iron for some of their necessary occasions, but that the iron imported from Great Britain was esteemed much the best, and wholly used by the shipping, and that the iron works of the province were not able to supply the twentieth part of what was necessary for the use of the country."¹ The Massachusetts Bay colony Assembly also voted a bounty of thirty shillings for every piece of duck or canvass made in the colony; also there was made in the colony small quantities of cloth made of linen and cotton, brown holland, a material used for women's clothes, thus preventing the importation of calicoes.² There were also woolen factories, nail forges, and furnaces for cast or hollow ware. A cotton factory was established in Beverly in 1790.

The above quotations and paragraph shows without further comment, I believe, the state of manufacture as it existed in Massachusetts. It is little wonder that despite the efforts of the British government to curtail manufacture before the Revolution, and the efforts of Hamilton to aid in protecting and encouraging it, that when necessity arose due to the Embargo and the War of 1812, manufacturing had a brisk rise. The profits were good, the demand great, and it was not

1. Pitkin, Statistical View p.463

2. ibid. p.464

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until after the conclusion of the war and the flooding of European goods, especially English, and the inability of American manufacturers to compete with the old established English industries, the capital, skilled labor, lower wages,¹ that recognition of aiding manufactures by a tariff was considered. Pitkin quotes figures which show the amounts of imports as against the exports for 1815 and 1816.² The period between January and October, 1815, the value of the imports was \$83,080,073, and from October 1, 1815, to October 1, 1816, the value of imports increased to the almost fabulous amount of \$155,302,700, of which the value paying ad valorem duties amounted to more than \$100,000,000, approximately \$70,000,000 of which was on woolens and cottons. The value of the exports for 1815-1816 was only \$134,478,205. Hart in his Commonwealth History of Massachusetts states that business and economic conditions were good in the state during the war, and that despite the hostile attitude of the state toward the war, it benefitted greatly. For example, manufactured goods were sent south in large quantities and in return large amounts of specie were brought back due to the impossibility of transporting the bulky goods of the South overland. At the session of the Massachusetts General Court, January, 1815, twenty-four companies were incorporated for the manufacture of woolen or cotton cloths,³ with a majority of the latter. It was the policy of the General Court to give all the encouragement it could to the development of domestic manufactures. On

1. Whisor, ~~Justin Memorial History of Boston 1630-1880~~
4 vols. Boston Ticknor and Company 1880 Vol.IV p.71
2. Pitkin, Statistical View. p.474
3. Bradford, History of Massachusetts Vol. 3 p.231

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1. Wilson, Daniel. *History of Boston 1630-1880*
4 vols. Boston: Ticknor and Company 1880 Vol. IV p. vi
2. Pitkin, Statistical View. p. 444
3. Bradford, History of Massachusetts Vol. 3 p. 231

October 16, 1815, a committee of the town council¹ reported that the town of Boston should grant or have power to grant suitable privileges and immunities to associations of Mechanics, Artificers, or Manufacturers within the town. The power of such council would of course be regulated by the Constitution and laws of the State and could only effect those who voluntarily associate together. One of the great reasons, too, why manufacturing increased was in the huge increase in population--demand now far exceeded supply, and the commercial warfare between this country and England prevented an adequate amount of goods to be imported; as a consequence, manufacturing was bound to spring up at the expense of shipping.

The increase of population, while a big factor in the development of manufacturing, also was an added feature to the opening of the new lands in the West. The poor ship-owners saw ports--as Salem and Beverly, prostrated by the war, and the large ship-owning families were moving from the minor ports to Boston. It was at this period that Boston began its big race to beat New York as the principal sea-port, and two of the factors in its downfall were the opening of the new lands in the West and the increase in population, and the flow of population to the new lands. New York had the huge advantage of being favorably situated not only on the sea, but also as regards favorable position near the inland waterways and trails. Consequently, the manufacturing interests were becoming predominant in New York state, and these manufac-

1. Boston Town Records 1814-1822 37th Report Boston p.44
2. Callender, Guy Stevens Economic History of the United States 1765-1860 Boston 1909 15 chapters 817 pp. p.433

October 18, 1813, a committee of the town council reported that the town of Boston should grant or have power to grant suitable privileges and immunities to associations of Mechanics, Artificers, or Manufacturers within the town. The power of such council would of course be regulated by the Constitution and laws of the State and could only affect those who voluntarily associate together. One of the great reasons, too, why manufacturing increased was in the large increase in population--demand now far exceeded supply, and the commercial activity between this country and England prevented an adequate amount of goods to be imported; as a consequence, manufacturing was bound to spring up as the expense of shipping.

The increase of population, while a big factor in the development of manufacturing, also was an added feature to the opening of the new lands in the West. The poor ship-owners saw ports--as Salem and Beverly, protected by the war, and the large ship-owning families were moving from the minor ports to Boston. It was at this period that Boston began its big race to beat New York as the principal sea-port, and two of the factors in its downfall were the opening of the new lands in the West and the increase in population, and the flow of population to the new lands. New York had the huge advantage of being favorably situated not only on the sea, but also as regards favorable position near the inland waterways and trails. Consequently, the manufacturing interests were becoming predominant in New York state, and these manufac-

turers much against the protest and dismay of the ship-owners backed the tariff of 1816. It is a rather ironic fact that most of the great manufacturers had received their money through their shipping interests and now heedless of that fact, they began to pass acts which would strengthen and protect manufacturing.

The tariff of 1816 was opposed, and none other than Daniel Webster stated against the tariff that it was against States Rights--a position which a few years later he was to change completely. His chief argument against the tariff was that it would work a hardship on the shipping interests by increasing the price of ship-building material.¹ Also, the people of New England feared that it would result in a decrease in imports, and as a consequence hurt American shipping. The manufacturers, on the other hand, a majority of whom had undoubtedly been recruited from the shipping ranks, demanded protection. Their money was now invested in factories, and they couldn't return to shipping without becoming involved in a world-wide competition. The tariff of 1816 was essentially one of protection--its features were²--imposed a duty of 25 per cent ad valorem on cotton and woolen goods until 1819 when the duty would be reduced to 20 per cent; a duty of 35 per cent was placed on articles which could be made at home (thus prohibitory). In respect to cottons, however, it was provided that all cotton cloths, the original cost of which was less than 25 cents per square yard, should be deemed

1. Garner, James W. Lodge, Henry Cabot History of the United States. Philadelphia 1906 4 Vols. Vol 2 p.796
2. ibid. p.769

There was much against the protest and dismay of the ship-owners because the tariff of 1816. It is a rather ironic fact that most of the great manufacturers had received their money through their shipping interests and now because of that fact they began to pass acts which would strengthen and protect manufacturing.

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1. Gerner, James W. Lodge, Henry Cabot History of the United States. Philadelphia 1906 4 Vols. Vol 2 p. 798
2. Ibid. p. 768

to have cost that much and pay duties accordingly--this was an establishment of the minimum principle whose real object at the time was to prevent the sale of East Indian coarse cloth in the American market.¹ There was a permanent duty of 30 per cent ad valorem placed on various other articles, such as hats, cabinet wares, and all manufactures of wood, carriages of all descriptions, leather, and all manufactures of leather, and paper of every description. To aid and encourage the manufacture of domestic sugar, a specific duty of three cents per pound was laid on all imported brown sugar.² A duty of 20 per cent ad valorem was placed on those articles which could not be produced at home. The fishing industry was helped by the tariff, for it placed a duty of one dollar per quintal on foreign-caught mackerel, and also similar duties were placed on other fish.³ As may be seen, however, the tariff was one essentially of protection, for the manufacturing interests, and consequently it is important to us, for it shows the way the wind was blowing.

In this chapter, I have discussed the advent of peace, the depression which followed it, the commercial warfare between England and the United States, with England's selfish desire or in a way natural desire to secure the majority of the trade for her own ships. I have discussed, likewise, the rise of new conditions--i.e. new lands, growth of population, growth or rather sudden development of manufacture with its result and effect on the tariff question. In

1. Pitkin Statistical View p.475

2. *ibid.* p.475

3. Hart, Commonwealth History of Massachusetts Vol.III p.545

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1. Phipps Statistical View p. 475
 2. Ibid. p. 475
 3. Harp, Commonwealth History of Massachusetts Vol. III p. 153

the following chapter, I will endeavor to bring more closely together these various facts with their direct result on the State of Massachusetts in general.

The chart which I am using here is made up of questions from different tables presented in different books. One notable exception is to be found, and that is, I have no mention of imports. There is a reason for this--namely, up until about 1890 the United States government and the various states concerned themselves little with keeping a record of imports. One can find figures for the imports which were made into the United States through all the various ports and states but up until 1890 these figures are all more or less guesswork to my way of thinking. Also, when once the government did begin to make a record of imports there arose the question as to how the value of the goods should be arrived at. Should it be the value or price which they brought in their own countries when sold, or should it be the value or price--say the real price which they brought in this country. As a consequence, the question of imports, although important, is a difficult one. As one may notice in the chart I have figures showing the duties collected on foreign merchandise imported into Massachusetts and the duties on foreign merchandise. That quoted these figures, and I feel that it is well to accept them at their face value, and one can determine fairly accurately the value of the total imports from these figures. That is to say, duties were collected on goods valued at \$1,394,394.

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CHAPTER V

COMMERCE OF MASSACHUSETTS FROM 1803 to 1820 as shown by table

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CHAPTER V

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The chart which I am using here is made up of portions from different tables presented in different books. One notable exception is to be found, and that is, I have no mention of imports. There is a reason for this--namely, up until about 1830 the United States government and the various states concerned themselves little with keeping a record of imports. One can find figures for the imports which were made into the United States through all the various ports and states but up until 1830 these figures are all more or less guesses--work to my way of thinking. Also, when once the government did begin to make a record of imports there arose the question as to how the value of the goods should be arrived at. Should it be the value or price which they brought in their own countries when sold, or should it be the value or price--say the real price which they brought in this country. As a consequence, the question of imports, although important, is a difficult one. As one may notice in the chart I have figures showing the duties collected on foreign merchandise imported into Massachusetts and the drawback on foreign merchandise. Hunt quoted these figures, and I feel that it is well to accept them at their face value, and one can determine fairly accurately the value of the total imports from these figures. That is to say, duties were collected on goods paying 27 1/2, 32 1/2,

and $42\frac{1}{2}$ per cent duties ad valorem. Thus, if we make a general average of these duties, we would arrive at 34. We could say then, that all the goods imported paid an average of 34 per cent duties ad valorem, or to make it easier, saying $\frac{1}{3}$ of value. Wenn we say ad valorem, we mean according to the value as set forth by the owners when declaring their shipment. Suppose now, for example, we take the year 1806; the duties on foreign merchandise imported equaled \$6,209,725. We must deduct from this \$2,479,026 the drawback--for a drawback contains the money which is returned to the importer when goods on which they have paid a duty are sent back to foreign countries. If we deduct the drawback, we arrive at a figure of \$3,730,699, the net duties on foreign goods imported. Taking our average duty of say $\frac{1}{3}$, we could arrive at a figure of \$11,192,097 as the net value of all imports into Massachusetts during that year. In order to determine the full amount of imports--i.e., the gross value, we would simply multiply the duties on merchandise imported by $\frac{1}{3}$ and obtain \$18,629,175. Thus we would arrive at a rough estimate of the full amount of all imports carried into Massachusetts during the year.

The gross value of imports were less than the total exports in 1804, 1805, 1806, 1807, 1809, 1810, and 1811; while the net value of imports were more than the total value of exports in 1812, 1813, 1814, 1815, and 1816. When the imports exceed the exports, it means the balance of trade is against us. The net value of imports then gives us, it seems to me, a

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Taking our average duty of say 1/3, we could arrive at a figure of \$1,913,566 as the net value of all imports into Massachusetts

settle during that year. In order to determine the full amount of imports--i.e., the gross value, we would simply multiply

the duties on merchandise imported by 1/3 and obtain \$18,629,178. Thus we would arrive at a rough estimate of the full amount of

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more accurate picture of how our trade was affected. It would be interesting to know just what percentage of the exports had already been imported--i.e., West Indies, etc? Consequently since we can't determine just the exact amount, it renders our figures a little more inexact. In the previous chapters, we have discussed the many things which affected our commerce; i.e., Treaty of Amiens signed in 1802, and its resultant decline of the carrying trade; English revival of the Rule of 1756 in 1805; Berlin decree in 1806; Milan decree, 1807; British orders in Council, 1807; Jefferson and Embargo, 1807-1808; Non-Intercourse Act, 1808; and the War of 1812.

From 1803 to 1807 the values of exports and imports increased due to the treaty of Amiens, 1802, and also due to renewal of war between England and France resulting in all countries involved practically, except the United States. In 1807 due to the Orders in Council, and the beginning of Embargo, there was a slight drop, but not a too alarming one. Even the registered tonnage in Massachusetts kept increasing during this period. In 1808, there was a huge drop in exports and imports due to the Embargo. This drop was due more to the fact that the effects of the Embargo were felt more during the following year, for when the Embargo was declared, many ships were in Europe and returned with cargoes, thus causing only a small slump in 1807, but a huge one in 1808. When the Non-Intercourse Act was declared, it also aided the huge slump, because it forbade trade with two of our biggest consumers--

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France and England. The drop in registered tonnage in 1808 is probably due to the fact that many of the merchants preferred to put their vessels in dry-dock instead of registering them and letting them rot in the water. From 1809 through 1811 recovery is apparent, but not in any sense of terms as in the years 1803 through 1807. The cause for this is to be found in the fact that England and France, although not at peace, were resuming their own carrying trade, and as a consequence, our shipping was not in such huge demand. The drop in registered tonnage in 1811 is said by Marvin¹ to have been caused by the treacherous seizures of Napoleon of American vessels. Marvin also claims that the small figures in 1810-1803 were due to the work of the Barbary pirates. From 1812 through 1815 there is a huge drop--especially in 1813-1814, due to the War with England. This drop was a result, of course, of Non-Intercourse as passed by Madison, and also the drop in tonnage is due to the capture of American vessels by the English. Revival is evident from 1816 through 1820, but this is only slight. The figures show how our markets were swamped with foreign goods after the war. Also, as we may notice, the figures show that registered tonnage is decreasing rapidly. This is due to several facts; i.e., after the war, the names of many vessels registered were stricken from the lists due to the fact that they had been lost at sea, captured, or sold; also it shows the change from shipping to manufactures. From the figures, too, we may deduce the fact through the net value

1. Marvin, Old Merchant Marine p.131

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of imports that trade from 1812 to 1816 was favorable toward other countries and that after that it was more even, due possibly to the Tariff of 1816 and the Navigation Act of 1817.

Niles quotes some figures which are interesting about arrival of American and foreign vessels in various ports. In 1816 the number of foreign vessels to arrive in Boston were 167; the number of Americans, 489--making a total of 656. In New York, the number was 1172--of which 403 were foreign, and 769 American. The arrival of coastwise vessels during the same year were 1684 in Boston and 1812 in New York. The Registered tonnage enrolled in New York in 1815 was 299,617,70, while that in Boston was 143,420.25--showing that New York's was almost double Boston's.¹ The arrivals and clearances for the year 1817 in Boston were 775 vessels arrived and 685 cleared. 1690 coastwise vessels arrived and 1994 cleared.² These figures do not include vessels with lumber, for they were not required to enter or clear. They were estimated at 2,000, however, making a grand total of 7103 arrivals in 1817.

The table showing the exports of Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina is interesting, for it shows that the export trade of New York was more in every year except 1804 and 1814. Pennsylvania's was more in 1813, as was South Carolina's due undoubtedly to the war. In 1815 and 1816 South Carolina's was more due probably to the rise of direct trade with cotton.

1. Niles Weekly Register Vol.XIII p.368

2. ibid. Vol. XII p.253

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Commerce of Massachusetts. 1803-1820¹

EXPORTS

IMPORTS²

Year	Value of Domestic	Value of Foreign	Total Value	Imports Net value of	Gross Value of	Duties on for mdse imported	Drawbacks on foreign merchandise	Registered Tonnage
1803	5,399,020	3,369,546	8,768,566	7,964,820	10,231,851	3,410,617	755,677	224,084.81
1804	6,303,122	10,591,256	16,894,378	11,488,023	16,204,245	5,401,415	1,572,074	250,638.97
1805	5,697,051	13,738,606	19,435,657	10,554,867	17,801,990	5,967,330	2,449,041	285,689.32
1806	6,621,696	14,577,547	21,199,243	11,192,097	18,629,175	6,209,725	2,479,026	306,078.87
1807	6,185,748	13,926,377	20,112,125	11,392,409	19,114,275	6,371,425	2,580,622	310,309.69
1808	4,508,632	3,619,690	5,128,322	4,138,425	6,884,551	2,294,717	895,242	266,519.91
1809	6,022,729	6,119,564	12,142,293	4,438,191	7,912,506	2,637,502	1,158,105	324,690.08
1810	5,761,771	7,251,277	13,013,048	8,403,549	11,855,013	3,951,671	1,150,488	352,806.82
1811	6,042,645	5,192,820	11,235,465	5,566,752	8,316,222	2,772,074	916,490	273,245.89
1812	3,935,229	2,648,109	6,583,338	8,166,744	9,521,790	3,173,930	451,682	266,976.20
1813	1,153,069	294,854	1,807,923	5,953,365	6,272,169	2,090,723	106,268	237,647.33
1814	1,078,077	55,722	1,113,799	4,403,943	4,477,740	1,492,580	24,599	225,774.05
1815	3,547,463	1,732,620	5,280,083	17,017,608	17,832,633	5,944,211	271,675	299,298.85
1816	5,008,974	5,127,465	10,136,439	14,739,363	17,842,029	5,947,343	1,034,222	274,049.63
1817	5,903,416	6,819,501	11,927,997	9,270,861	12,653,085	4,217,695	1,127,408	243,310.86
1818	5,698,646	6,299,150	11,998,156	2,484,690	14,748,951	4,916,317	1,188,087	172,886.14
1819	4,873,992	6,525,921	11,339,913	10,644,540	14,223,066	4,741,022	1,192,842	176,269.93
1820	3,861,435	7,147,487	11,008,922	8,019,378	12,429,783	4,143,261	1,470,135	130,251.14

1. Compiled from Hunt's Merchant Magazine. Vol. 1. 1829 p.273. Pitkins Statistical View of Commerce of U.S. p.53f. and Marvin, American Merchant Marine. p.131 and p.193

2. Figures on imports compiled by myself from figures given; i.e., duties and drawbacks.

Value of Exports of Massachusetts, New York,
Pennsylvania, and South Carolina, 1803-1820.¹

<u>Year</u>	<u>Massachusetts</u>	<u>New York</u>	<u>Pennsylvania</u>	<u>South Carolina</u>
1803	8,768,566	10,818,387	7,525,710	7,811,108
1804	16,894,378	16,081,281	11,030,157	7,451,616
1805	19,435,657	23,482,943	13,762,252	9,066,625
1806	21,199,243	21,762,845	17,574,702	9,743,782
1807	20,112,125	26,357,963	16,864,744	10,912,564
1808	5,128,322	5,666,058	4,013,330	1,664,445
1809	12,142,293	12,581,562	9,049,241	3,247,341
1810	13,013,048	17,242,330	10,993,398	5,290,614
1811	11,235,465	12,266,215	9,560,117	4,861,279
1812	6,583,338	8,961,922	5,937,750	2,036,195
1813	1,807,923	8,185,494	3,577,177	2,968,484
1814	1,133,799	209,670	-----	737,899
1815	5,280,083	10,675,373	4,593,919	6,675,129
1816	10,136,439	19,690,031	7,196,246	10,849,409
1817	11,927,997	18,707,433	3,735,592	10,372,615
1818	11,998,156	17,872,261	8,759,402	11,440,962
1819	11,399,913	13,587,378	6,293,788	8,250,790
1820	11,008,922	13,163,244	5,743,579	8,882,940

1. Pitkin--Statistical View pp.50,51,52,57

Value of Exports of Manufactures, New York,
Pennsylvania, and South Carolina, 1820-1820.

Year	Massachusetts	New York	Pennsylvania	South Carolina
1820	11,008,922	12,163,844	5,442,579	8,882,940
1819	11,399,913	13,587,378	5,393,788	8,830,780
1818	11,998,156	14,878,261	5,739,408	11,440,932
1817	11,927,927	15,707,435	5,735,582	10,373,815
1816	10,135,439	13,690,081	7,198,345	10,848,409
1815	5,280,082	10,575,373	4,593,919	5,875,129
1814	1,153,799	208,870	-----	727,899
1813	1,807,923	8,185,484	3,577,177	2,968,484
1812	5,583,328	8,951,925	5,937,750	2,036,195
1811	11,235,463	12,258,615	9,580,117	4,861,279
1810	13,013,043	17,845,350	10,993,398	5,290,514
1809	12,142,293	13,361,582	9,049,241	3,247,341
1808	5,128,282	5,665,058	4,013,330	1,864,445
1807	20,112,125	28,397,963	15,864,744	10,912,564
1806	21,193,242	21,782,845	14,574,702	9,743,782
1805	19,435,857	23,482,942	13,762,225	9,066,625
1804	16,894,378	16,981,261	11,030,127	7,431,616
1803	9,768,596	10,818,587	7,523,710	7,611,108

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION--SUMMARY of

Conditions in Massachusetts, 1815-1820.

The prosperity of Massachusetts during the war was due almost entirely to the growth of manufactures. This is of course borne out by our chart which shows growth of commerce 1803-1820. There was a decline in exports, in imports and shipping was practically prostrate in 1813-1814. In 1814; i.e., January--manufactures were estimated to have grown to a value of fifteen to twenty millions a year.¹ The great growth of manufactures and the sale of them to the South resulted in the drawing of a half a million dollars a month from the banks of the South in payment for them.² Money was a drug and the banks were at their wit ends to know how to lend it.³ The following figures show this increasing control of all specie by Massachusetts banks. In 1809 the banks of Massachusetts held only \$820,000 in specie. It was estimated that by the middle of the year 1814 Massachusetts banks held nearly \$7,000,000 in specie. The banking capital of the entire country was only one-third greater than Massachusetts or in other words the Massachusetts banks controlled for the most part by Federalists controlled one-third of the entire capital of the country.⁴ Niles⁵ gives the following report on finances of Massachusetts given June 7, 1816. The public debt; i.e., stock, funded debt, and

1. Adams, J.T., New England in Republic. p.284

2. Ibid., p.284

3. Adams, Henry, History of U.S. Vol. VIII. p.15

4. Ibid., Vol. VII.p.387ff.

5. Niles Weekly Register. Hezekiah Niles, Editor Vol.X. p.312

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION--SUMMARY OF

Conditions in Massachusetts, 1813-1830.

The prosperity of Massachusetts during the war was due almost entirely to the growth of manufactures. This is of course borne out by our chart which shows growth of commerce 1803-1830. There was a decline in exports, in imports and shipping was practically prostrate in 1813-1814. In 1814; i.e., January--manufactures were estimated to have grown to a value of fifteen to twenty millions a year.¹ The great growth of manufactures and the sale of them to the South resulted in the drawing of a half a million dollars a month from the banks of the South in payment for them.² Money was a drug and the banks were at their wit's end to know how to lend it.³ The following figures show this increasing control of all specie by Massachusetts banks. In 1809 the banks of Massachusetts held only \$380,000 in specie. It was estimated that by the middle of the year 1814 Massachusetts banks held nearly \$7,000,000 in specie. The banking capital of the entire country was only one-third greater than Massachusetts or in other words the Massachusetts banks controlled for the most part by Federalists controlled one-third of the entire capital of the country.⁴ Allen⁵ gives the following report on finances of Massachusetts given June 5, 1818. The public debt; i.e., stock, funded debt, and

1. Adams, J. T., New England in Republic. p. 284
2. Ibid., p. 284
3. Adams, Henry, History of U.S. Vol. VIII. p. 18
4. Ibid., Vol. VII. p. 387
5. Allen Weekly Register. Republican Union, Editor Vol. X. p. 313

loans--amounted to \$1,525,213.51; Stocks belonging to the Commonwealth amounted to \$1,668,354.74; property belonging to the Commonwealth \$105,447.59; the annual revenues of Massachusetts equaled \$306,333.33. These figures give us a bare glimpse of the conditions in the state at the time and show that the state at that time was in good financial condition.

Massachusetts at first did not feel the adverse change in conditions because it depended on its shipping for the source of its profits and at this time the growth of manufactures aided shipping by using vessels to send goods abroad. As a consequence when peace was declared there were huge cargoes of manufactured articles and products of the last two harvests. Soon, however, foreign vessels in the harbors and now the old rates of profit were at an end; American vessels were meeting competition. The manufactures which had aided our shipping now experienced a decline. Adams¹ gives as his reason for this the following: the United States poured domestic produce worth 50 millions into England, and England retaliated by pouring 40 millions of imports into the U.S. and as a consequence the American market was inundated with manufactures which although they paid duties of 25% were sold at prices which ruined American competition. The sale of the rich cargoes of vessels captured by the Americans brought money and buyers into New England but with the decline of manufactures and Parliament's placement of a duty on lumber in 1815 ruined not only shipping but also lumber trade.

1. Adams, Henry--History of U.S. Vol. 9 p.95-96

losses--amounted to \$1,525,215.51; stocks belonging to the Com-
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1815 ruined not only shipping but also lumber trade.

It is of some interest to quote here from Niles.¹ A letter written to Niles says that the commerce of New England, and more especially Massachusetts and Boston was bound to drop to the cessation of the War in Europe, unless canals, roads, etc., were built to keep trade away from its natural emporium; i.e., New York. The Federalists are blamed for the ruin of manufactures after the war because they favored peace at any cost. Again he (the writer) claims and justly that the people of the country will not soon forget the attitude of the people of Massachusetts (in the Federalists, not all people) during the war. This attitude of Massachusetts is going to be against the best interests of Boston, for Boston depends for commerce upon the agriculture of the Southern States; i.e., commerce of the Eastern states built upon an intercourse with the Southern. The merchants of Boston derived about 3/5 of their commodities for exports from the Southern States. The writer goes on to point out that due to these facts and the condition of war in Europe the merchants of Boston succeeded in extending trade to all portions of the world and gathered their wealth in cash, or in commodities which came to the Southern States, thus furnishing new supplies for trade in continuous procession. The writer has many fine ideas in his letter as will be well brought out in the next paragraph.

The change from prosperity to adversity can be found by the following: emigration was to the Mohawk Valley and Western New York state and was caused I think to the fact

1. Niles Weekly Register. March-September 1815. Vol. VIII

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many people in Massachusetts were tillers of the soil at heart and when the broad, fertile plains of the Mohawk, etc., were opened to them they siezed the opportunity to go there and escape the harsh climate and poor soil of Massachusetts. Adams,¹ says that in 1814, January, the Massachusetts banks held about \$7,300,000 in specie and that with the advent of peace in 1815; i.e., January and February, they probably held more, as the causes, i.e., growth of manufactures, which led to the influx were not removed. In June, 1815, the Massachusetts banks held only \$3,464,000 and the drain on their specie continued until in June, 1816, the amount of specie was reduced to \$1,260,000. The attitude of the Federal government toward New England and more especially Massachusetts is well reflected by the Treasury.² The banks in New England were the only ones able to make specie payments and the Treasury although it collected in Treasury notes and notes of local banks (all equivalent to specie) accepted elsewhere local notes at depreciation. To make matters still worse the Treasury made the creditors in New England, take payment in whatever specie it had on hand, while elsewhere it paid off with what it collected. Thus, banks of Massachusetts and New England were paying off their debts in full, while the rest of the country was paying off their debts in local money (i.e., state notes, bank notes, etc.) which was valued less than specie. Also Massachusetts and New England paid debts with specie of par value and received payment of debts owed to them in money often below par.

1. Adams, Henry.- History of U.S. Vol. 9. p.97-98

2. Ibid., p.97-98

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Henry Adams¹ gives still more figures on the wealth of Massachusetts. The increase of the wealth was really surprising. In 1803 Massachusetts had seven banks with a capital of \$2,225,000 and deposits of \$1,500,000. In June 1816 Massachusetts had twenty-five banks with a capital of \$11,500,000 and deposits of 2,133,000. This small increase in deposits was due to the decline of shipping and manufactures, also due to drain of specie that followed peace, but the capital had increased almost five times. There were too many banks, however, for the capital began to decrease so that in 1817 it was down to 9,300,000 a decline of almost 20%. The increase in capital though from 1803 to 1816 or more especially say from 1808-1816 is due probably to manufactures for the imports show little increase. In 1803 the debts to the banks amounted to \$3,850,000 while in June 1817 they amounted to \$12,650,000. The gross amount of duties collected in 1800 were less than 3,200,000 while the gross amount in 1816 was more than 6,100,000--the duties therefore had not quite doubled in 16 years and the Embargo and war is undoubtedly responsible. The exports of domestic produce of Massachusetts in 1803 were valued at \$5,400,000 while in 1816 they were valued at \$5,008,000² showing once again the decline and also bringing out the fact I believe that exports of foreign origin were those which really did more to help our trade and this of course was due to our position of neutrality. The total tonnage registered in Massachusetts for foreign trade in 1800 was

1. Adams, Henry. History of U.S. Vol. IX. p.158
2. Pitkin, Statistical View of Commerce. pp.55-56

Henry Adams gives still more figures on the wealth of Massachusetts. The increase of the wealth was really surprising. In 1803 Massachusetts had seven banks with a capital of \$2,332,000 and deposits of \$1,500,000. In June 1818 Massachusetts had twenty-five banks with a capital of \$11,500,000 and deposits of \$8,133,000. This small increase in deposits was due to the decline of shipping and manufactures, also due to drain of specie that followed peace, but the capital had increased almost five times. There were too many banks, however, for the capital began to decrease so that in 1817 it was down to \$8,300,000 a decline of almost 30%. The increase in capital though from 1803 to 1818 or more especially say from 1808-1818 is due probably to manufactures for the imports show little increase. In 1808 the debt to the banks amounted to \$3,830,000 while in June 1817 they amounted to \$12,230,000. The gross amount of duties collected in 1800 were less than 3,300,000 while the gross amount in 1818 was more than 8,100,000--the duties therefore had not quite doubled in 18 years and the Embargo and war is undoubtedly responsible. The exports of domestic produce of Massachusetts in 1803 were valued at \$8,400,000 while in 1818 they were valued at \$8,008,000 showing once again the decline and also bringing out the fact I believe that exports of foreign origin were those which really did more to help our trade and this of course was due to our position of neutrality. The total tonnage registered in Massachusetts for foreign trade in 1800 was

211,000 tons, in 1816 it was 274,000 tons; while tonnage registered for coasting trade was 75,000 tons in 1800 and 129,000 in 1816.

Another factor in the decline was that although the population was increasing, it was increasing far less in proportion to the increase in the Middle States and the West States. For example, the South and New England contained about 1/2 population of country; yet from 1800-1820 its population increased as 100 to 129 in them; 100 to 192 in Middle States, and 100 to 423 in Western States.¹ Thus, wealth was increasing more than population, but despite this manufacturing was prostrate, shipping being driven from the carrying trade, and the State despised because of its war policy and the Hartford convention. Immigration might have helped but did not because the immigrants tended to stay where they landed. There were 22,000 immigrants in 1817 and they arrived in Boston to about a number of 2,000, 7,000 in New York and 7,000 in Philadelphia. It wasn't until the high tide of immigration that Boston, Massachusetts and New England picked up.

One feature which aided in the decline of shipping as I have discussed; i.e., sailing vessels, long voyages, etc., was the growth of the clippers, packets, and steam ships. I intend to make only a brief mention of these--only to show how the trend was going--for with the packet and clippers many glorious voyages were made; but they presaged steam and with steam England began to control the carrying trade. The

1. Adams, Henry. History of U.S. Vol. 9. p.154-155

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Chesapeake or Baltimore clippers were made to the demand for larger, better, and faster vessels. They ranged in size from 75 to 200 tons and in length from 60 to 125 feet, never carried more than two masts, and were low and rakish in appearance. They received their name from the regional, American use of the intransitive verb "to clip" used in the sense of adjective showing a description of unusual speech or quickness--thus "to clip"--"to move swiftly."¹ They first appeared in Baltimore where because of their unusual speed they were used in the forbidden West Indies trade. The packet ships had their origin in 1816 when the famous Black Ball line between New York and Liverpool began operations. In 1822 a second line to Liverpool was formed and in 1823 a third line to Hull was formed. The packets were the predecessors of the steam lines; they had fixed sailing days and arrived and sailed with great regularity. They were larger and better than the merchant vessels, strong of hull, with a moderate height of spars and breadth of canvas, but were not built too much for speed.² They carried the higher cost cargoes which could afford to pay higher freight charges and also there were provisions made for cabin and steerage passengers. The captains were exceedingly skilled and reduced the dangers and terms of a passage from one to three months, to one of comparative luxury and a definite number of days; i.e., 14 to 20.³ The steamship Savannah left its home port, Savannah, Georgia on May, 26, 1819 and went across to Liverpool in

1. Meloney. Heritage of Tyre. p.28

2. Marvin. American Merchant Marine. p.187

3. Meloney. Heritage of Tyre. p.39ff.

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25 days arriving there June 20. On 18 of the 25 days steam was used. It had been designed for the Atlantic packet service, built in New York and of little more than 300 tons. She possessed paddle wheels of iron wings, which could be taken off in stormy weather and she was well provided with sails, for she only used her engine when the wind was light or ahead.¹ This trip with the use of steam presaged the change which could be expected and for that season is notable.

So we come to the conclusion--shipping was to reach great heights in Massachusetts in the 1820's, 1830's and its clipper ships were going to establish records and feats which will never live down. The period which I studied established the beginnings; it gave to Massachusetts commerce that spirit which carried it to its glory. I hope I have shown how this was done and also I hope I have brought out the troubles which it underwent especially from 1815 through 1820. It was a period which was unique--it achieved its glory through hardships, privation, want, and above all an unquenchable spirit which was embodied in its merchants and sailors. To them all praise should be given and I think Morison does so in the following lines:²

Sea Captains young or old, and the mates, and....intrepid sailors

Pick's sparingly without noise by thee, old ocean, chosen by thee;....

Suckled by thee, old husky nurse, embodying thee, Indomitable, untamed as thee'.

1. Marvin. American Merchant Marine. p.184-185

2. Morison, S.E. Maritime History of Massachusetts p.371

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SUMMARY

On July 4, 1789, the Congress of the United States passed the first law which aided shipping. This aid was rendered by favoring American owned vessels, vessels owned by Americans but built abroad, etc., against foreign owned vessels. As a consequence American registered tonnage tendered to increase with occasional slumps up until 1800. In 1801 the Peace of Amiens was declared by England and France, only to be followed by the Napoleonic wars which involved all of Europe. As a consequence the United States in its position of being practically the only neutral power received most all of the carrying trade. The result was a booming of American fishing which lasted until the Revival of the Rule of 1756 by England; i.e., neutrals carry on no trade which they had not carried on in time of peace. Soon followed the Berlin and Milan decrees and the British Orders in Council all aimed to prevent neutrals carrying on trade with the enemy. Trade was hurt, but not seriously until Jefferson in 1807 issued his famous Embargo which supposedly forced all American ships to remain at home. In 1808 due to the tremendous protest raised against the Embargo, the Non-Intercourse Act was substituted. This revived shipping somewhat but both England and France continued to seize American vessels and as a result in 1812 war with Great Britain became a reality.

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through the trade carried on with the enemy. Another side of the story is to be found in the support which was given by Massachusetts to it through enlistments and contributions. The war had many ill effects on Massachusetts. It caused a decline of shipping through the loss of foreign markets, decline of prices and the resumption by European nations of their own carrying trade. As a result we undergo a period in the National Government when to revive commerce, reciprocity is agreed to between England and the United States. This was not favorable to the United States and finally the Navigation Act of 1817 is passed. This once again favors United States vessels were not allowed. This was followed by a general reciprocity Act which amounted to little.

One feature of the war was that it caused a huge rise in the growth of manufactures and this growth was in the beginning at least helpful to shipping. The decline of shipping indirectly aided the growth of manufactures; i.e., merchants turned to manufacturing, but the growth of manufactures kept shipping from going down-hill steadily. Manufacturing tended to increase due to the closing by the Embargo of foreign imports, to the demand during the war for goods and articles which previously had been made in Europe, to the increase in population, and to the Yankee ingenuity and favorable physical and climatic conditions. Soon followed to the tariff of 1816 which aided manufacturing and which was supported by the people of New England as a whole.

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The conditions in Massachusetts right after the war are first prosperity and then decline. The decline is the result of a growth in population less than that of other states, a diminishing of capital in the banks, a rapid flow of emigration toward the West and the unfavorable attitude of the country as a whole against Massachusetts. This attitude while unfair was at least one which was to be expected due to the way the war was supported in Massachusetts. Then, too, the advent of clippers and packets, and steam meant that the glorious days were to go--only to be followed later by days that were glorious in themselves, but to my mind not quite as wonderful.

Trade during this period was carried on all over the world--to Europe, Canton, the South Sea Islands, and Seal-islands. The Canton trade--where in its triangular aspects the vessels first went to the Northwest coast, exchanged trinkets, for the skins of the sea-otter, then to the Hawaiiis for sandalwood, exchanging firearms and muskets, or perhaps to the islands of the South Seas where beche de mer was the big attraction. Finally arriving in Canton where the fur-otter skins, sandalwood, beche-de-mer, and seal skins from seal islands were exchanged for teas, nan-keens, silks, etc. Trade also was carried on with the West Indies and South America and these too had their adventurous aspects. The merchants and crews had a spirit embodied in them which enabled them to carry on such hazardous voyages and with the decline of the sailing vessels the great saga of Massachusetts history on the sea dies.

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
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